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The Restoration of States' Civil Rights Authority:
An Alternative Approach to Expressive Association
After Boy Scouts ofAmerica v. Dale
STPHEN P. ANWAY**
This note argues the Supreme Court erred in upholding the Boy Scouts of
America's right to exclude homosexuals by virtue of its First Amendment
freedom of expressive association. By way of introduction, the author observes
Dale's noticeable resemblance to the disgraced opinions of the nineteenth and
twentieth century in which the Court upheld the legality of gender and race-
based discrimination. The author then summarizes the Court's expressive
association jurisprudence and-applying this framework to the facts of Dale-
argues the Court erroneously concluded that (1) the Boy Scouts maintained an
anti-gay expressive message; (2) Dale's reinstatement infringed upon that
message; and (3) such infringement is not outweighed by a compelling state
interest. The author next discusses the regulatory power of state governments in
preventing invidious discrimination and-through a series of hypotheticals-
examines the extent to which Dale compromises this authority. Finally, the
author concludes with an innovative approach for analyzing issues of expressive
association that both squares with precedent and circumvents the problematic
aspects of Dale.
To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave responsibility.
Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with serious consequences to
the Nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory, and try novel
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country. This
Court has the power to prevent an experiment We may strike down the statute
which embodies it on the ground that, in our opinion, the measure is arbitrary,
capricious or unreasonable. We have power to do this, because the due process
clause has been held by the Court applicable to matters of substantive law as well
as to matters of procedure. But in the exercise of this high power, we must be
ever on our guard, lest we erect our prejudices into legal principles. If we would
guide by the light of reason, we must let our minds be bold.1
* This note was co-recipient of the Donald S. Teller Memorial Award for the student
writing that contributed most significantly to the Ohio State Law Journal.
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New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1872, Myra Bradwell, a married woman and resident of Illinois, applied to
the state supreme court for a license to practice law.2 The court denied her petition
on the basis that married women did not possess the capacity to enter into binding
contracts and, therefore, were incapable of establishing the legal covenant
inherent between attorney and client.3 Mrs. Bradwell appealed to the United
States Supreme Court, alleging that the state's denial of her petition violated the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Federal
Constitution.4 In affirming the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court, three
justices concurred that "nature herself... has always recognized a wide
difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman.... The
paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign
offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator."5
In 1958, Mildred Jeter, an African American woman, and Richard Loving, a
Caucasian man, were lawfully married in the District of Columbia.6 Shortly
thereafter, the Lovings returned to their home state of Virginia, where they were
indicted and sentenced to one year in jail for violating the state's statutory ban on
interracial marriages.7 The Lovings challenged their convictions in the United
States Supreme Court on the ground that Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.8 The Court
invalidated the Virginia statute, criticizing the trial judge's contention that
"[a]lmighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he
placed them on separate continents .... The fact that he separated the races
shows that he did not intend for the races to mix."9
Justice Stevens extolled Justice Brandeis' comment on states' right to experiment with "things
social" in Boy Scouts ofAm. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 663-64 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). See
Paul D. Carrington, Legal Ethics, Fair Trials and Free Press: Article Our Imperial First
Amendment, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 1167, 1187 (2001) ("Particularly at a time when sexual mores
are changing, there is much to be said for allowing states to experiment with diverse policies in
the manner long advocated by Justice Brandeis, especially when an experiment has no
significant extraterritorial effects").
2 Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139 (1873).31d. at 141.4Id. at 137 (noting that Ms. Bradwell claimed "she was a citizen of the United States, and
that having been a citizen of Vermont at one time, she was, in the State of Illinois, entitled to
any right granted to citizens of the latter State").5Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
6 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2 (1967).
7Id. at 3; see VA. CODE ANN. § 20-58 (Michie 1960). Specifically, the statute defined
"colored person" to mean "[e]very person in whom there is ascertainable any Negro
blood. . . except... members of Indian tribes existing in this Commonwealth having one fourth
or more of Indian blood and less than one sixteenth of Negro blood." Id. § 1-14. Virginia was
one of sixteen states that prohibited and punished marriages on the basis of racial classifications
in 1967. Loving, 388 U.S. at 6.
8388 U.S. at 2.
9 d. at 3. Alexis de Tocqueville argues that anti-miscegenation statutes were enacted at a
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And on the threshold of the twenty-first century, James Dale, an exemplary
Boy Scout of twelve years and an assistant scoutmaster, attended a seminar
addressing the psychological and health needs of gay and lesbian adolescents.10 A
local newspaper covering the event identified Dale as the co-president of the Gay-
Lesbian Alliance at Rutgers University.11 In response to the article, leaders of the
Boy Scouts of America (BSA) forwarded Dale a letter revoking his membership
and requesting he sever all ties with the organization. 12 Soon thereafter, Dale filed
a complaint against the BSA, alleging the revocation of his membership violated
New Jersey's public accommodation statute.13 On appeal, the United States
Supreme Court denied Dale's complaint, deferring to the BSA's contention that
application of the statute would infringe upon the organization's right to
expressive association by virtue of "homosexual conduct [being] inconsistent
with the values embodied in the Scout Oath and Law, particularly with the values
represented by the terms 'morally straight' and 'clean.""
4
This triad of cases makes clear that many forms of inequitable treatment now
proscribed by civil rights legislation are, or have been, justified on moral
grounds.15 The moral foundation of such cases, however, has historically been
time when "[t]he chief care of the legislators in this body of penal laws was the maintenance of
orderly conduct and good morals in the community, thus they constantly invaded the domain of
conscience, and there was scarcely a sin which was not subject to magisterial censure." ALEXIS
DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 38-39 (Phillips Bradley ed., 1972). Such
legislation, de Tocqueville contends, is "discreditable to human reason" and "bears such
striking marks of a narrow, sectarian spirit and of those religious passions which had been
warmed by persecution."Id.
1° Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640,644-45 (2000).
"Id. at 645.
12Id. (noting that after Dale requested an explanation for his membership revocation, the
BSA responded that the organization "specifically forbid[s] membership to homosexuals").
31d. The New Jersey statute prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation in places
of public accommodation. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 10: 5-4 (West Supp. 2000).
4 Dale, 530 U.S. at 650.
15 The Bradwell concurrence, for example, appealed to "Nature" and the "Creator."
Similarly, the trial judge in Loving referred to the divine intention of "God" and Dale accepted
the BSA's interpretation of the terms "morally straight" and "clean." Dale, 530 U.S. at 701
(Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that Justice Stevens "describes the changing attitudes toward gay
people and notes a parallel with the decline of stereotypical thinking about race and gender");
Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1242-43 (N.J. 1999) (Handler, J., concurring)
("Like stereotypes about an individual based on sex or race, similar assumptions about a lesbian
or gay man are false and unfounded, and reveal nothing about that individual's moral character,
or any other aspect of his or her personality."). Indeed, the semblance of these decisions has
been recognized by many of the BSA's strongest supporters. See, e.g., Richard Weizel, In
Hopes of Reviving Donations: A Pamphlet, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2001, at 14CN3 (noting that a
board member of a local United Way, voting to approve a non-discrimination policy that would
withhold funds from BSA programs, stated that such language "reminds me of the same kind of
language that was used conceming African-Americans and other minority groups 30 or 40
years ago"); Marc S. Spindelman, Reorienting Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 N.C. L. REV. 359, 482
(2001) (stating that anti-gay laws display "a noticeable resemblance to the map of
miscegenation bans that one could have drawn for the Court in [Loving]").
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problematic in two respects. First, decisions providing a moral basis for
discriminatory practices have proven unreliable in their long-term stability.'6 In
Planned Parenthood v. Casey,17 for example, the Supreme Court denounced the
invidious gender discrimination manifest in the Bradwell concurrence," declaring
that such views "are no longer consistent with [the Court's] understanding of the
family, the individual, or the Constitution."' 9 In similar fashion, the Court rejected
the racial segregation endorsed by the trial judge in Loving-albeit over a decade
earlier-in Brown v. Board of Education,20 thereby overruling the "separate but
equal" doctrine set forth in Plessy v. Ferguson.2'
Second, decisions justifying discriminatory practices on moral grounds have
proven defective in their present-day application.2 In contrasting the social eras
in which Brown and Plessy were decided, for example, the Casey Court noted
that although "[s]ociety's understanding of the facts upon which a constitutional
16See, e.g., Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 300 (1987) (White, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that the Bradwell decision upheld legislation "which perpetuated sex-role
stereotypes and which impeded women in their efforts to take their rightful place in the
workplace"); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982) (referring to
Bradwell as an example of an attempt "to exclude women from particular areas simply because
[the state] believed women were less able than men to perform a particular function"); Dothard
v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,344 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (describing Bradwell as "long
since discredited"); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (citing the Bradwell
concurrence to support the proposition that "our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history
of sex discrimination ... rationalized by an attitude of 'romantic paternalism' which, in
practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a cage").
'7505 U.S. 833 (1992).
'
8 Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 321 (1993) (Stevens, J.;
dissenting) (noting that the basic attitude of the three concurring justices in Bradwell is properly
characterized as "invidiously discriminatory").
9 Casey, 505 U.S. at 897.20347 U.S. 483 (1954).
21163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (upholding a statute requiring the separation of African
Americans and Caucasians in public conveyances). The Brown Court declared that "[a]ny
language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected." Brown, 347 U.S. at 494-95.
In rejecting the Fourteenth Amendment challenge in Plessy, the Court had used similar
morally-based language as Bradwell and Loving, stating "in the nature of things" the
Amendment "could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color." Plessy,
163 U.S. at 544; see Roger Wilkins, Editorial, The Court's Term Is Over, But Not the Discord,
N.Y. TIMEs, June 30, 2000, at A24 ("Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist's opinion in the Boy
Scouts case.. . combines the disgrace[d] reasoning in Plessy v. Ferguson... and the United
States military's unworkable 'don't ask, don't tell' policy.').
22Professor Paul D. Carrington notes that when "[t]here is a genuine collision of moral
values .... one might ... think its resolution an appropriate matter for democratic self-
govemment." Carrington, supra note 1. The unsuitability of judicial activism in the area of
social mores is exacerbated in light of the significant impact such decisions play in shaping
public sentiment. See Christopher Wolfe, Forum on Public Morality: Public Morality and the
Modem Supreme Court, 45 AM. J. JURIS. 65, 92 (2000) (noting that the Court's role
"establishes the legal norms that indirectly but powerfully contribute to the formation of future
public opinion"); CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, JUDICIAL ACTVISM 59-60 (1996) (reviewing the
impact ofjudicial activism on social mores).
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ruling was sought in 1954 was... fundamentally different from the basis claimed
for the decision in 1896[,] .... we think Plessy was wrong the day it was
decided.... ,23 Casey thus fashions the notion that decisions legalizing
discrimination may not be justified solely by the moral values of their era.24
Instead, these decisions may be problematic in their present-day application,
irrespective of the Court's moral principles or those of the social majority. 5
This note contends the Supreme Court erred in holding that Dale's
reinstatement would violate the BSA's freedom of expressive association and, in
so doing, raised concerns with respect to both its long-term stability and its
present-day legitimacy in authorizing discrimination. Part II of this note provides
a background on the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence regarding the right
to intimate and expressive association. Part M argues that Dale is inconsistent
with this jurisprudence in its conclusions that (1) the BSA maintained an anti-gay
expressive message; (2) Dale's reinstatement infringed upon that message; and
(3) such infringement is not outweighed by a compelling state interest. Part IV
discusses the regulatory power of state governments in preventing invidious
discrimination and the extent to which Dale compromises this authority. Finally,
Part V concludes with an innovative approach for analyzing issues of expressive
association that both squares with precedent and circumvents the problematic
aspects of Dale.
II. BACKGROUND: FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
In the years between 1984 and 1988, the United States Supreme Court
decided three cases in which organizations invoked the right of free association to
defend against anti-discrimination statutes.26 The Court's interpretation of
associational protection in these cases, in turn, provided the jurisprudential
foundation on which Dale was decided over a decade later.2 7 A sound
comprehension of Dale thus requires a brief history of this foundation.
The First Amendment to the Federal Constitution provides that "Congress
shall make no law.. .abridging the freedom of speech....,,28 This clause,
23 Casey, 505 U.S. at 863.
24 see id.
25Indeed, Justice Souter separately dissented in Dale to make clear that "[t]he right of
expressive association does not, of course, turn on the popularity of the views advanced by a
group that claims protection. Whether the group appears to this Court to be in the vanguard or
rearguard of social thinking is irrelevant to the group's rights." Dale, 530 U.S. at 701 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
26See New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York 487 U.S. 1 (1988); Bd. of
Dirs. of Rotary, Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
27See, e.g., Dale, 530 U.S. at 658 ("[In the associational freedom cases such as Roberts,
Duarte, and New York State Club Assn., after finding a compelling state interest, the Court went
on to examine whether or not the application of the state law would impose any 'serious
burden' on the organization's rights of expressive association.").
28U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, has been interpreted
to comprehend a "freedom of association' '29 in two distinct senses.30 In one sense,
freedom of association contemplates the fight to "intimate association," which
precludes the state from intruding against an individual's decision to enter or
maintain intimate human relationships.31 In the other sense, freedom of
association contemplates the right to "expressive association," which precludes
the state from intruding against an organization's First Amendment expressive
activities, such as speech and religion.32 Although both forms of association may
be implicated when the state interferes with an organization's selection of
individuals for a common endeavor, the degree of constitutional protection varies
depending on the extent to which each liberty is jeopardized.33 The following
sections discuss the Court's jurisprudence with respect to each aspect of protected
association.
A. Freedom ofIntimate Association
The right of intimate association safeguards an individual's decision to
establish and preserve "highly personal relationships" from unjustified state
interference.34 This protection derives from the constitutional recognition of the
fundamental role such relationships play in safeguarding individual freedom.35 In
this respect, freedom of association affords protection as a fundamental element
29 The Supreme Court did not formally recognize the freedom of association as an implied
constitutional right until NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, in which the Court struck down
a government order for the membership list of the NAACP. 357 U.S. 449, 462-64 (1958).
Justice Harlan, writing for a unanimous Court, held that such a requirement burdened the
organization's ability to associate and pursue its collective goals. Id. Such infringement, the
Court concluded, may be overridden only by a compelling state interest, which the state had
failed to demonstrate. Id. For an array of viewpoints on the freedom of association, see
generally ALiDAIR MCINTYRE, AFrER ViRTuE (1981); ROBERT A. NSBET, COMMUNITY AND
POWER (1962); NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, ANOTHER LBERALISM (1987); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA
UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975); Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1980); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J.
1713 (1988); Kenneth L. Karst, Equality and Community; Lessons from the Civil Rights Era,
56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 183 (1980).
3 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617.31Id. at 618. The notion of intimate association was first suggested in Kenneth L. Karst,
Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980). See C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the
First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964 (1978); Reena Raggi, An
Independent Right to Freedom of.Association, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1977).32Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618.33Duarte, 481 U.S. at 544-45 (1987) (noting that the Court determines "the nature and
degree of constitutional protection by considering separately the effect of the challenged state
action on individuals' freedom of private association and their freedom of expressive
association").34Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618; see Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,399 (1923).35Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618.
1478 [Vol. 62:1473
RESTORATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS A UTHORTY
of personal liberty.36
The Supreme Court has historically considered factors such as size, purpose,
and selectivity in determining whether an organization wanants the protection of
intimate association.37 Familial bonds, for example, are by their very nature
highly intimate affiliations, characterized by small numbers, a high degree of
selectivity, and seclusion from others in critical aspects of the relationship.
38
Conversely, organizations lacking these characteristics, such as large business
enterprises, are unlikely to give rise to the concerns underlying the right to
intimate association and, consequently, fail to invoke its protection.3 9 Between
these extremes, however, the Court has been indisposed to specify the level of
protection afforded an individual's decision to enter into, or exclude someone
40from, a particular association.
Perhaps the most significant intimate association decision to emerge from
contemporary jurisprudence is Roberts v. United States Jaycees,4 1 in which two
local chapters of the Jaycees violated the organization's bylaws by admitting
women as regular members.4 2 In response, the Jaycees' national president advised
the chapters that a motion to revoke their charters would be considered at a
forthcoming meeting.43 The chapters filed charges of discrimination with the
Minnesota Department of Human Rights, alleging the exclusion of women
violated the Minnesota Human Rights Act's prohibition of gender discrimination
in places of public accommodation.44 On appeal, the Supreme Court rejected the
361d.; Duarte, 481 U.S. at 545 ("[T]he freedom to enter into and carry on certain intimate
or private relationships is a fundamental element of liberty protected by the Bill of Rights.").37Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620; see, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 62-63 (2000)
(holding that an order granting visitation rights to the grandparents unconstitutionally interfered
with the fundamental right of parents to rear children); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 391
(1978) (striking down a Wisconsin statute that prohibited residents from marrying if they were
negligent in their child support obligations); Carey v. Populations Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 687,
702 (1977) (holding that a New York statute prohibiting the advertisement and sale of
contraceptives to minors was an unjustified state intrusion on decisions concerning child
bearing); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977) (invalidating a
municipality's housing ordinance that categorized a second grandchild living in a home as an
illegal occupant).38Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620.39Id.
4 1d. For a general discussion on the intimate association rights of small, private
organizations, see Michael M. Bums, The Exclusion of Women From Influential Men's Clubs:
The Inner Sanctum and the Myth ofFull Equality, 18 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 321 (1983).
41468 U.S. at 620. Although the concept of intimate association was originally discussed
in Karst, supra note 31, Roberts was the first case to explicitly recognize the concept as a
distinct aspect of associational freedom.42 The purpose of the Jaycees, as stated in its bylaws, was to pursue "such educational and
charitable purposes as will promote and foster the growth and development of young men's
civic organizations in the United States .... " Roberts, 468 U.S. at 612.431Id. at 614.
44 Id. The Minnesota Human Rights Act provides that it is an unfair discriminatory practice
"[t]o deny any person the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, and accommodations of a place of public accommodation because of race, color,
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Jaycees' intimate association defense, concluding that the organization lacked the
distinctive characteristics sufficient to invoke First Amendment protection.45 To
the contrary, each of the chapters included over four hundred members, actively
recruited with no criteria for judging membership, and only denied applicants on
the basis of gender.
46
The Roberts decision marked a historic determination in favor of a narrowing
approach to the right of intimate association and remains the foremost authority
on the stringent organizational requirements necessary to invoke its protection.47
Indeed, its analytic framework served as the basis for the Court's rejection of the
intimate association claims in two leading cases discussed in the following
section-Bd. of Directors of Rotary, Intl v. Rotary Club of Duarte48 and New
York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York.49 As in Roberts and Dale,
however, the organizations involved in these cases attempted to defend against
civil rights legislation not only on intimate association grounds, but also on the
theory that such statutes violated their right to expressive association.50
B. Freedom ofExpressive Association
Implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment
is a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of those activities.5'
The Roberts Court observed that an "individual's freedom to speak, to worship,
and to petition the government for the redress of grievances could not be
creed, religion, disability, national origin or sex." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03(3) (West Supp.
1984). In addition, the Act defined "place of public accommodation" as "a business,
accommodation, refreshment, entertainment, recreation, or transportation facility of any kind,
whether licensed or not, whose goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or
accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available to the public." Id.
§ 363.01(18).45Roberts, 468 U.S. at 621.46Id. Moreover, the Court noted that "numerous nonmembers of both genders regularly
participate in a substantial portion of activities central to the decision of many members to
associate with one another, including many of the organization's various community programs,
awards ceremonies, and recruitment meetings." Id.
47 See Douglas 0. Linder, Freedom of Association After Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
82 MIcH. L. REv. 1878, 1885 (1984) (discussing that although intimate association 'as
important implications for other private associations with discriminatory membership policies,"
the concept is inapplicable to large organizations).
4'481 U.S. 537, 549 (upholding a statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis of gender
in places of public accommodation).
49487 U.S. 1, 14 (denying a facial challenge to a city ordinance prohibiting discrimination
by institutions that include over four hundred members, provide regular meal service, and
receive payment from nonmembers).
'
01d. at 13; Duarte, 481 U.S. at 544-45.51 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622. As a result, the Court has held that "impediments to the
exercise of one's right to choose one's associates can violate the right of association protected
by the First and Fourteenth Amendment... ." Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 80 n.4
(1984) (Powell, J., concurring).
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vigorously protected from interference by the State unless a correlative freedom
to engage in group effort toward those ends [was] not also guaranteed.' 52 The
Constitution thus guarantees the freedom of expressive association as an
indispensable means of preserving other First Amendment liberties.5s
State infringement of an organization's right to expressive association has
traditionally taken three forms.5 4 First, infringement may occur when the
government requires disclosure of membership lists from an organization seeking
anonymity.55 Second, interference may arise when the government imposes
penalties on, or withholds benefits from, individuals based on their affiliation to a
56particular group. Finally, state infringement may take the form of legislation that
interferes with the internal affairs of a given organization, such as a statute that
prohibits discriminatory membership practices.57 In this respect, "[f]reedom of
association... plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate."5'8
Organizations seeking immunity from such infringement must engage in the
requisite First Amendment activity to implicate its protection. Although this
protection is not reserved for advocacy groups, an organization must engage in
"some form of expression" to fall within its ambit.59 In application, this
requirement has been interpreted leniently, such that "[e]ven the training of
outdoor survival skills or participation in community service might become
expressive when the activity is intended to develop good morals, reverence,
patriotism, and a desire for self-improvement.,
60
Moreover, organizations seeking protection from state infringement must
demonstrate that the challenged state action interferes with their expressive
activity. The Supreme Court has noted, for example, that the forced inclusion of
an unwanted individual infringes upon an organization's freedom of expressive
association if the presence of that person "affects in a significant way" the group's
ability to advocate public or private viewpoints.6' Accordingly, courts must
52Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622.53Id. ("According protection to collective effort on behalf of shared goals is especially
important in preserving political and cultural diversity and in shielding dissident expression
from suppression by the majority."); see, e.g., Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556,
575 (1974); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-85 (1965); NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415,431 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,462 (1958).
5Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622-23.
55Id.; see, e.g., Patterson, 357 U.S. at 462-63; Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign
Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 91-92 (1982).
56 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622; see, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180-84 (1972).57Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622; see, e.g., Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477,487 (1975).58Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623; see Kevin Francart, Comment, No Dogs Allowed: Freedom of
Association v. Forced Inclusion Anti-Discrimination Statutes and Their Applicability to Private
Organizations, 17 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 273 (2000) ("[l'he freedom not to associate is plainly
presupposed from the freedom of association.").9Dale, 530 U.S. at 648.
6°Roberts, 468 U.S. at 636 (O'Connor, J., concurring).




determine the specific content of an organization's expressive message and the
degree to which that message would be burdened, affected, or restrained by the
challenged statutory requirements.62
The right to expressive association, however, is not absolute.63 State
infiingement of an organization's expression may be overridden by "compelling
state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved
through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms."'' This
consideration requires courts to balance the state interest served by the regulation
with the degree of intrusion upon the organization's expression.65
Accordingly, the analytic framework of expressive association may be
summarized in a three-part analysis: first, courts must consider whether an
organization engages in expression; second, courts must inquire whether the state
infringes upon that expression; and third, courts must determine whether that
infringement is justified by a compelling state interest, unrelated to the
suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved by less restrictive means. The
following sections discuss the application of this analytic framework in the
context of three leading cases, coined "the Roberts trilogy."
1. The Roberts Trilogy, Part I: Roberts v. United States Jaycees Revisited
The intrinsic and instrumental characteristics of intimate and expressive
association coincide when the state interferes with an organization's selection of
individuals for a common endeavor.66 The Minnesota Human Rights Act at issue
in Roberts thus implicated not only the Jaycees' freedom of intimate association,
but also its right to associate for expressive purposes.67 As a result, the Roberts
Court, after denying the Jaycees' intimate association claim, shifted its attention
to whether the statute unconstitutionally infringed upon the organization's
expressive message.68
Applying the first prong of the expressive association analysis, the Roberts
Court determined that the Jaycees engaged in a form of expression sufficient to
invoke First Amendment protection given that its members "ha[d] taken public
positions on a number of diverse issues" and "engage[d] in a variety of civic,
charitable, lobbying, fundraising, and other activities .... "69 In applying the
62Dale, 530 U.S. at 647-48.
63Id. at 648.
6Robertns, 468 U.S. at 623.65id
"6MId. at 618.
67The Roberts Court noted that "when the State interferes with individuals' selection of
those with whom they wish to join in a common endeavor, freedom of association in both of its
forms may be implicated. The Jaycees contend that this is such a case." Id.681Id. The Court upheld the lower court's determination that the Jaycees was a "place of
public accommodation" for purposes of the statute. Id. at 625. "Like many States and
municipalities," the Court held, "Minnesota has adopted a functional definition of public
accommodations that reaches various forms of public, quasi-commercial conduct." Id.691d. at 626-27.
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second prong of the analysis, however, the Court concluded that the Jaycees had
failed to demonstrate that the Minnesota statute imposed any serious burdens on
that expression.70 The Court noted that the statute "require[d] no change in the
Jaycees' creed of promoting the interests of young men, and it impose[d] no
restrictions on the organization's ability to exclude individuals with ideologies or
philosophies different from those of its existing members."71 Yet even presuming
an incidental abridgment of the Jaycees' protected speech, the Roberts Court held
that the infringement served a "compelling state interest of the highest order" in
assuring its citizens equal access to publicly available goods and services.72
2. The Roberts Trilogy, Part I: Bd. of Directors of Rotary, Int'l v.
Rotary Club of Duarte
The right to expressive association was again explored three years later in Bd.
of Directors of Rotary, Int 7 v. Rotary Club of Duarte,73 in which a local Rotary
Club's charter was terminated by the parent organization, Rotary International,
for admitting women in violation of the organization's constitution.74 The local
club and two of its female members filed suit, alleging a violation of California's
statutory prohibition of gender discrimination in business establishments. 75 On
appeal before the Supreme Court, Rotary International argued that the forced
inclusion of women violated its right to intimate and expressive association.76
Applying the analytic framework set forth in Roberts, the Court denied Rotary
International's intimate association claim on the basis that the organization was
"not the kind of intimate or private relation that warrants constitutional
protection" in its size, purpose, and selectivity. 7 7 Rather, local Rotary Clubs were
characterized by an excessive number of members, reciprocity with other clubs,
and strong public involvement.78
701d. at 627. The Roberts Court focused on the extent to which women would impact the'
outcomes of the organization's voting practices, stating that there is "no basis in the record for
concluding that admission of women as full voting members will impede the organization's
abilit to engage in these protected activities or to disseminate its preferred views." Id.
, Id.
72 d. at 624. Note that the third stage of the expressive association analysis requires that the
challenged state action not only serve a compelling state interest, but also be achieved by the
least-restrictive means and be unrelated to the suppression of ideas. Id. at 623. To that end, the
Court noted that the 'Minnesota Act does not aim at the suppression of speech, does not
distinguish between prohibited and permitted activity on the basis of viewpoint, and does not
license enforcement authorities to administer the statute on the basis of such constitutionally
impermiissible criteria." Id.
73481 U.S. 537 (1987).
74Id. at 541.
75Id. at 542.
76 d at 544.
77Id. at 546.781d. The Duarte Court emphasized that "[t]he size of local Rotary Clubs ranges from
fewer than 20 to more than 900. There is no upper limit on the membership of any local Rotary
Club." Id. (citation omitted).
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The Duarte Court likewise denied Rotary International's expressive
association defense. 79 The Court commenced its analysis by conceding the
organization exemplified a form of expression protected by the First Amendment
in its "variety of commendable service activities.'" As in Roberts, however, the
Court denied the organization's expressive association claim at the second stage
of the analysis, concluding that the inclusion of women did not "affect in any
significant way the existing members' ability to carry out their various
purposes."8 Moreover, the Court held that any hypothetical infringement on the
organization's right of expressive association was outweighed by the state's
compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against women. 2
3. The Roberts Trilogy, Part HT. New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v.
City of New York
One year after Duarte, the Court addressed a facial challenge to a statute in
New York State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York 3 that forbade gender
discrimination in any "institution, club, or place of accommodation [that] has
more than four hundred members, provides regular meal service, and regularly
receives payment from nonmembers for the furtherance of trade or business. 84 A
consortium of 125 clubs and associations filed suit against the city, seeking a
declaration that the statute facially violated the First Amendment freedom of
intimate and expressive association.5 On certiorari, the Supreme Court denied the
79Id. at 549.
8
°Id. at 548. These activities, the Court noted, were consistent with the "basic goals of
humanitarian service, high ethical standards in all vocations, good will, and peace." Id.
" Id. ("As a matter of policy, Rotary Clubs do not take positions on 'public questions,'
including political or international issues.").
21d. at 549. The Duarte Court recognized that although the statute may impose "some
slight infringement on Rotary members' right of expressive association," such infringement
was justified because it serves the compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against
women. Id. To support this proposition, the Court cited Buckley v. Valeo, which held that the
right of association may be limited by state regulations necessary to serve a compelling interest
and unrelated to the suppression of ideas. Id. (citing Buckley, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976)).
3487 U.S. 1 (1988).841d. at 6 (quoting N.Y.C. ADMi. CODE § 8-102(9) (1986)). The 1964 Act at issue in New
York State Club was amended in 1986 to extend the anti-discrimination provisions to any
"institution, club or place of accommodation [having] more than four hundred members,
provid[ing] regular meal service and regularly receiv[ing] payment for dues, fees, use of space,
facilities, services, meals or beverages directly or indirectly from or on behalf of nonmembers
for the furtherance of trade or business." N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9) (1986). Any such
club "shall not be considered in its nature distinctly private." Id.85 New York State Club, 487 U.S. at 11. The Court noted in New York State Club that First
Amendment facial challenges may prevail when the challenged statute either "could never be
applied in a valid manner" or "may inhibit the constitutionally protected speech of third
parties." Id. (quoting City Council in Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 798
(1984)). The Court first concluded that the consortium of clubs failed to demonstrate that the
ordinance could never be constitutionally applied, noting that organizations such as the Jaycees
would be subject to the statute. Id. at 12. The Court then separately addressed whether the
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intimate association claim, holding that the statute's regular meal service and
nonmember payment requirements were "at least as significant in defining the
nonprivate nature of these associations" as the characteristics of the organizations
in Roberts and Duare.
86
In addition, the Court denied the organizations' allegation that the statute
infringed upon their freedom of expressive association. 7 Although noting that the
organizations' "selective process of inclusion and exclusion is protected by the
Constitution," the Court held that the statute neither significantly affected the
association freedom of members nor required the clubs "to abandon or alter" any
activity protected by the First Amendment.88 Even presuming such infringement
however, the Court recognized the "'compelling interest' in combating invidious
discrimination."' 9
4. Departure from Expressive Association Analysis: Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston
The Supreme Court addressed a variant claim to freedom of expression in
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group ofBoston,90 in which a
group of gay, lesbian, and bisexual descendents of Irish immigrants (GLIB)
applied to participate in Boston's annual St. Patrick's Day parade.91 When parade
organizers denied the application, the GLIB obtained an injunction and marched
uneventfully among parade participants and spectators.92 After the parade
organizers refused to admit the GLIB the following year, the group filed suit,
alleging a violation of the state's statutory prohibition of discrimination based on
sexual orientation in places of public accommodation.93
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the statutory requirement to admit a
parade contingent not of the private organizers' own choosing violated the First
Amendment.94 Applying the first prong of the analysis, the Court concluded that
the parade organizers engaged in a form of expression sufficient to invoke First
statute inhibited the intimate and expressive association of third parties. Id. at 12-13.
86Id. at 12. These factors, the Court concluded, indicate the non-private nature of the
organizations subject to the statute "because of the kind of role that strangers play in their
ordinary existence." Id.
17 1d. at 13.
88Id. (quoting Duarte, 481 U.S. at 548).
"Id. at 14 n.5.
90515 U.S. 557 (1995).
91id. at 561.
921d. The City of Boston had authorized the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council,
an unincorporated association of individuals elected from South Boston veterans' groups, to
organize the St. Patrick's Dayparade. Id. at 560.
931d. at 561. Specifically, the Massachusetts statute at issue in Hurley prohibited "any
distinction, discrimination or restriction on account of... sexual orientation ... relative to the
admission of any person to, or treatment in any place of public accommodation, resort or
amusement." MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 98 (1992).94Hurley, 515 U.S. at 581.
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Amendment protection. 95 The Court observed that parades were a traditional form
of speech, "characterized by flags and banners with all sorts of messages., 96 This
form of expression, the Court held, receives protection similar to other forms of
pure speech, such as newspaper editorials, 97 noncommercial advertisements in
daily papers,98 and cable transmissions.99
Precisely because of the analogous nature of parades to such forms of pure
speech, however, the Hurley Court departed from the expressive association
framework, instead addressing the parade organizers' claim in the context of
traditional First Amendment analysis.'00 As such, the Court needed only to
address whether the leniency with which the organizers admitted participants
forfeited its constitutional protection.'01 Finding no such forfeiture, the Court
declared that "[s]ince every participating unit affects the message conveyed by the
private organizers, the state courts' application of the statute produced an order
essentially requiring petitioners to alter the expressive content of their parade."'0 2
Significantly, however, the Court noted that the individual participation of gays,
lesbians, and bisexuals would not be problematic for purposes of the First
Amendment.10 3
5. Conclusions: The Roberts Trilogy and Hurley
The Roberts trilogy sets forth principles underpinning each stage of the
expressive association analysis, including (1) the types of organizations that
engage in a form of expression sufficient to invoke constitutional protection;
(2) the degree of state interference necessary to violate the Constitution; and
(3) the classes of citizens for whom anti-discrimination statutes serve a
95d. at 569.
961fd.
97Id. at 570; see, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974)
(concluding that a statute allowing a political candidate to demand that a newspaper print any
reply to criticisms of the candidate is violative of the First Amendment right to free speech).
98Hurley, 515 U.S. at 570; see, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,285-
86 (1964) (holding that the First Amendment right to free speech exempts a newspaper from a
libel action brought by a public official unless the official proved that the statement was made
with actual malice).
99Hurley, 515 U.S. at 570; see, e.g., Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S.
622, 636 (1994) (noting that cable programmers and operators are entitled to the protection of
the speech and press provisions of the First Amendment).
I'°Even the Dale majority acknowledged this departure, noting that "[i]n Hurley, we
applied traditional First Amendment analysis to hold that the application of the Massachusetts
public accommodations law to a parade violated the First Amendment rights of the parade
organizers." Dale, 530 U.S. at 659.
'
0oHurley, 515 U.S. at 571-80.
102id. at 572-73.
'03Id. at 572 ("[The Massachusetts law] does not address any dispute about the
participation of openly gay, lesbian, or bisexual individuals in various units admitted to the
parade.'). Rather, the Court held, "the disagreement goes to the admission of GLIB as its own
parade unit carrying its own banner." Id.
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compelling state interest. This section briefly reviews each stage and concludes
with a discussion of Hurley's distinct place in associational jurisprudence.
First, the Roberts trilogy provides clues as to the types of organizations that
engage in expression protected by the First Amendment. In Roberts, for example,
the Court found that the Jaycees, a nonprofit corporation established to promote
and foster the growth and development of young men's civic organizations,
engaged in a form of expression sufficient to invoke the right of expressive
association.'04 Similarly, the Duarte Court found that Rotary International, also a
nonprofit corporation founded to provide humanitarian services and build world
peace, engaged in a form of expression safeguarded under the First
Amendment.'05 The Roberts trilogy thus suggests that organizations need not
engage in advocacy-related activity to fall within the ambit of expressive
association.
10 6
Second, the Roberts trilogy provides insight into the degree of state
interference necessary to violate the First Amendment.'07 The Court in both
Roberts and Duarte, for example, required a "significant" and "serious" state
burden on an organization's "shared" expressive purpose to constitute unlawful
infringement.'08 In application, this standard has presented substantial hurdles for
organizations seeking to invoke the protection of expressive association.109 Such
hurdles are perhaps no better illustrated than in the fact that, until Dale, the Court
had "never once found a claimed right to associate in the selection of members to
prevail in the face of a State's antidiscrimination law."' 0 Indeed, although the
Court's unwillingness to invalidate the anti-discrimination statutes in Roberts and
Duarte was additionally attributable to an overriding state interest in eradicating
gender discrimination, both decisions observed a lack of "significant" state
infringement in the first place.'
Third, the Roberts trilogy provides examples of statutes that serve compelling
'14Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626-27 (noting that the Jaycees' "civic, charitable, lobbying,
fundraising, and other activities" were adequate to invoke the First Amendment protection).
'
0
°Duarte, 481 U.S. at 548 (holding that the "variety of commendable service activities" in
which Rotary International engages is sufficient to invoke the First Amendment).
106 See, e.g., Duarte, 481 U.S. at 548; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626-27.
07 See, e.g., New York State Club, 487 U.S. at 13; Duarte, 481 U.S. at 548; Roberts, 468
U.S. at 627.
'O°Duarte, 481 U.S. at 548; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622,626-27.
'09See, e.g., New York State Club, 487 U.S. at 13; Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 28
(1989) (upholding an ordinance restricting admission to certain dance halls to persons between
the ages of fourteen and eighteen). But see Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1, 11
(1990) (holding that a bar association may not constitutionally use compulsory dues to finance
political and ideological causes).
1o Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 679 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
I'See, e.g., Duarte, 481 U.S. at 548 (concluding that the inclusion of women did not
"affect in any significant way the existing members' ability to carry out their various
purposes"); Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627 (asserting that the statute "require[d] no change in the
Jaycees' creed of promoting the interests of young men, and it impose[d] no restrictions on the
organization's ability to exclude individuals .vith ideologies or philosophies different from
those of its existing members").
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state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved
through less restrictive means. !2 In Roberts and Duarte, for example, the Court
held that statutes prohibiting the discrimination of women serve a compelling
state interest sufficient to override interference with an organization's
expression 13 More generally, these cases indicate that the Court does not assess
whether anti-discrimination statutes are justified by a compelling state interest
based on whether the protected citizens fall within a "suspect classification" under
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 4 Consequently,
given "the State's usual power... when a legislature has reason to believe that a
given group is the target of discrimination," the Roberts trilogy suggested a
promising future for states' ability to protect a wide range of citizens from
invidious discrimination." 5
In theory, Hurley did little to compromise this future." 6 Although the
decision limited the states' authority to suppress pure speech, its analysis
appeared inapplicable in determining the states' ability to prevent identity-based
membership discrimination." 7 To the contrary, the Hurley Court noted that the
Massachusetts statute "had been applied in a peculiar way" to directly interfere
with the private organizers' pure speech, thereby requiring departure from
expressive association analysis.'' 8
III. APPLICATION: THE DALE MISTAKE
If the Roberts trilogy was a step forward in states' ability to prevent invidious
discrimination, Boy Scouts ofAmerica v. Dale19 was a giant leap backward. Yet
standing alone, Dale's limitation of states' civil rights authority does little to
undermine its legitimacy. 12 0 Indeed, the examination of judicial decisions is often
112See, e.g., New York State Club, 487 U.S. at 14 n.5; Duarte, 481 U.S. at 549; Roberts,
468 U.S. at 624.
"13See, e.g., Duarte, 481 U.S. at 549 ("Even if the... Act does work some slight
infringement on Rotary members' right of expressive association, that infringement is justified
because it serves the State's compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against women.");
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623 ("Minnesota's compelling interest in eradicating discrimination
against its female citizens justifies the impact that application of the statute to the Jaycees may
have on the male members' associational freedoms.").
114In Craig v. Boren, the Court held that women are not a "suspect class" for purposes of
the Fourteenth Amendment Rather, gender classifications must only serve an important
governmental objective and substantially relate to that objective to withstand constitutional
challenge. 429 US. 190, 199 (1976).
"'Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572.
116 Andrew R. Varcoe, The Boy Scouts and the First Amendment: Constitutional Limits on
the Reach ofAnti-Discrimination Law, 9 LAW & SEX. 163, 192 (2000) (describing Hurley as "a
case that was not primarily understood by the Court as a free-association case").
117 1d.
"'Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572 ("In the case before us, ... the Massachusetts law has been
applied in a peculiar way.").
"9530 U.S. 640 (2000).2 0 To the contrary, many restrictions on states' civil rights authority are duly justified, such
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better conducted by scrutinizing analysis rather than by rendering result-based
policy conclusions. To that end, this section examines the Court's analysis in
Dale.
A. Parties to the Litigation
Perhaps no category of appellate jurisprudence is more dependent on fact-
based analysis than cases involving the First Amendment.121 Such decisions are
often "case[s] where the ultimate conclusions of law are virtually inseparable
from findings of fact.' '122 A firm understanding of Dale thus requires a brief
background on the BSA and James Dale.
1. The Boy Scouts ofAmerica
The BSA is a private, recreational organization comprised of more than four
million youth and one million adults. 23 With ninety million members since its
inception in 1910, the organization is "the largest youth movement the free world
has ever seen.' '124 This inclusiveness is fostered by a number of admission
policies, not the least of which is that "neither [the federal] charter nor the bylaws
of the Boy Scouts of America permits the exclusion of any boy."' 25 In addition,
the BSA strives for a "representative membership" that "reflects proportionately
the characteristics of the boy population of its service area.
' 126
Although the BSA is highly centralized at the national level, its infrastructure
partitions into subdivisions that "own" their troops and are annually chartered.
127
This local ownership under a corporate name effectively creates a franchise
structure, providing for a unique relationship with local governments,
communities, and religious organizations. 28 The BSA, for example, "receives a
as the exemption of small, private clubs from anti-discrimination statutes. See Bums, supra note
40.
121 Dale, 530 U.S. at 647.
'2ld at 648; Hurley, 515 U.S. at 567 ("[T]he nature of protected speech carries with it a
constitutional duty to conduct an independent examination of the record as a whole.... [and]
requires us to 'review the finding of facts by a State court... where a conclusion of law as to a
Federal right and a finding of fact are so intermingled as to make it necessary, in order to pass
upon the Federal question, to analyze the facts .... .") (quoting Fiske v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 380,
385-86 (1927) (citation omitted)).
123Brief for Respondent at 1, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (No. 99-
699)' 1 4ld.
125 id.
126 Dale, 530 U.S. at 666 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
27Respondent's Brief at 1-2, Dale (No. 99-699); Dale, 530 U.S. at 666.
28d. "In New Jersey alone,...troops were sponsored and owned by over
600government agencies or organizations operating under state aegis, including 15 city
governments, 92law enforcement agencies, 191 public schools, 281 school parent-teacher
associations and groups, 21 boards of education, 6 Army National Guard units, 4 Navy units,
I Coast Guard unit, 2 Disabled Veterans units, 3 Air Force units, 10 Army units, and 132 fire
14892001]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL -
wide range of special privileges and benefits from federal and state government,
such as a federal charter, favorable tax treatment, [and] access to facilities and
services. 1 29 Furthermore, the BSA recognizes a quarter of its chartered
institutions as public education organizations.13 0
Various rules governing the BSA illustrate its pluralistic disposition with
respect to religious and sexual issues.13 ' The organization's bylaws, for example,
describe the BSA as "absolutely nonsectarian in its attitude toward ... religious
training."132 Consistent with this notion, the BSA does not purport to maintain
views regarding religious practices or duties. 33 In addition, the organization
specifically requires members to "learn about sex and family life from their
parents, consistent with their spiritual beliefs.' 34 Nothing in any distributed BSA
material expresses its position on sexual matters. 135
2. James Dale
James Dale began scouting at the age of eight and officially joined the BSA
three years later. 36 He remained a Scout until he turned eighteen, earning
admission to the "Order of the Arrow," an honor established to reward those
"who best exemplify the Scout Oath and Law in their daily lives," and the rank of
"Eagle Scout," a distinction awarded to only three percent of all members. 137
During that time, Dale held various youth leadership positions and was asked by
organization officials to become an Assistant Scoutmaster upon his eighteenth
birthday. 138 Indeed, "[b]y all accounts, Dale. was an exemplary Scout."'13 9
At age nineteen, Dale left home to attend Rutgers University, where he first
acknowledged himself as gay.140 His sexual identity was thereafter exposed in a
departments." Id. at 2.
'
29Id. at 3.
130Id. at 2. Moreover, public schools permit the BSA special access to recruit in
classrooms and on school grounds. The BSA guidebook urges school coordinators "to give a
'personal invitation to every boy in school to join scouting,' and exhorts the 'classroom
presentation coordinator' to 'band every boy, tag every boy, stick every boy' to reach the
BSA's ultimate goal: 'Every classroom, every boy."' Id.
131Id. at3.
132 Dale, 530 U.S. at 670 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
'33 Respondent's Brief at 3, Dale (No. 99-699) ("No troop may require its members to hold
any particular religious belief or participate in any particular religious ceremony.").
134Id.
135 Dale, 530 U.S. at 668-69 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Indeed, "[a]ccording to strict written
policy, adult leaders are not to discuss sex with their boys, not even to answer questions." David
France, Strugglefor the Soul of Scouting, NEWSWEEK, August 6, 2001, at 44, 48.136Dale, 530 U.S. at 644.
1371d. at 665 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that Dale also earned twenty-five merit
badges and gave more than twelve years of active and honored participation).
13 8Id.
139 aI at 644.
1401d. at 645.
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newspaper article covering a gay-lesbian conference at Rutgers.1 41 Although the
article made no mention of his involvement with the BSA, Dale's membership
was rescinded as a result of his identification as a homosexual. Dale sued,
alleging the revocation of his membership violated New Jersey's public
accommodation statute.142
B. The Rationale of the Dale Court
The New Jersey Superior Court's Chancery Division entered summary
judgment for the BSA on the basis that the organization was not a "place of
public accommodation." 143 The New Jersey Superior Court's Appellate Division
reversed, concluding that the BSA constituted a public accommodation to which
the statute was applicable, and the state supreme court affirmed.144 On certiorari,
the United States Supreme Court declined to question either the state court's




'44Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court denied both the BSA's claim to intimate association
and expressive association. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1242-43 (N.J. 1999).
Citing Duarte, the court held that the BSA is not 'sufficiently personal or private to warrant
constitutional protection' under the freedom of intimate association" because the organization
was nonselective, large in size, and in the practice of inviting nonmembers to attend meetings.
Id. at 1221 (quoting Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 546
(1987)). In addition, the court noted that although the "Boy Scouts expresse[d] a belief in moral
values and use[d] its activities to encourage the moral development of its members," it was "not
persuaded... that a 'shared goal[]' of Boy Scout members [was] to associate in order to
preserve the view that homosexuality is immoral." Id. at 1223-24. Accordingly, the court
denied the organization's expressive association claim, noting that Dale's "inclusion would not
'affect in any significant way [the BSA] existing members' ability to carry out their various
purposes."' Id. at 1225 (quoting Duarte, 481 U.S. at 548). Even presuming, arguendo, that the
statute significantly infringed the BSA's right to expressive association, the court held that New
Jersey has a compelling interest in eliminating "the destructive consequences of discrimination
from our society." Id. at 1227-28.
In concurrence, Justice Handler "reminded us of both how far we have come in combating
invidious discrimination and how far we still have to go." Randy M. Mastro, A Tribute to
Justice Alan B. Handler: Justice Handler's Concurrence in Dale v. Boy Scouts of America: A
Morality Tale, 30 SErONHALLL. REV. 741,742 (2000). Handlernoted:
One particular stereotype that we renounce today is that homosexuals are inherently
immoral. That myth is repudiated by decades of social science data that convincingly
establish that being homosexual does not, in itself, derogate from one's ability to
participate in and contribute responsibly and positively to society. Like stereotypes about
an individual based on sex or race, similar assumptions about a lesbian or gay man are
false and unfounded, and reveal nothing about that individual's moral character, or any
other aspect of his or her personality....
Dale, 734 A.2d at 1242-43 (Handler, J., concurring) (citation omitted).1451d. The Dale Court addressed whether the BSA constituted a place of public
accommodation in passing, noting in a footnote that "[f]our State Supreme Courts and one
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United States Court of Appeals have ruled that the Boy Scouts is not a place of public
accommodation" and that "[n]o federal appellate court or state supreme court-except the New
Jersey Supreme Court in this case--has reached a contrary result." Dale, 530 U.S. at 657 n.3.
The absence of further analysis likely derives from the Court's recognition that the ultimate
interpretation of New Jersey's public accommodation statute is that of the state supreme court.
The Court's account of cases involving public accommodation statutes vis-i-vis the BSA,
however, failed to reference other contexts in which the BSA has, indeed, been found to
constitute a place of public accommodation. Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, for
example, employs the term "place of public accommodation." 42 U.S.C. § 2000(a) (1994). The
leading case construing Title II in this regard is the Seventh Circuit case, Welsh v. Boy Scouts of
America, in which the court concluded that the BSA constituted a "place of public
accommodation" for the purposes of Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 993 F.2d 1267, 1278
(7th Cir. 1993). Title II cases, in turn, have been held to provide guidance on the manner in
which courts should interpret Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12181-12189. See, e.g., Bowers v. NCAA, 9 F. Supp. 2d 460,484 (D.N.J. 1998) (stating that
some courts have looked to Title II for guidance in interpreting Title II); Tatum v. NCAA, 992
F. Supp. 1114, 1121 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (noting that Title II decisions "provide instructive
analysis in Title I ADA cases"); Elitt v. U.S.A. Hockey, 922 F. Supp. 217, 223 (E.D. Mo.
1996) (employing Title II "for instructive analysis" of the plaintiff's Title III action). Indeed, "if
Title 111 does not cover the Boy Scouts, the organization could flatly exclude all boys with a
disability, a history of disability, or who are regarded as having a disability. An aggrieved
disabled boy attempting to integrate himself into the social mainstream of American boyhood
would be prevented from doing so and would have no remedy in the courts." Matthew A.
Stowe, Note, Interpreting "Place of Public Accommodation" Under Title II of the ADA: A
Technical Determination with Potentially Broad Civil Rights Implications, 50 DUKE L.J. 297,
321 (2000) (arguing that the "legislative history of the ADA, as evidence of Congress's intent,
weigh[s] heavily in favor of a finding that membership organizations without close ties to a
structural facility, like the Boy Scouts, either constitute 'places of public accommodation' or
operate 'places of public accommodation"'). But see Martha Minow, Lecture, Partners, Not
Rivals?: Redrawing the Lines Between Public and Private, Non-Profit and Profit, and Secular
and Religious, 80 B.U. L. REV. 1061, 1081 (2000) (arguing that such "resulting reforms
breached the public/private line and interfered, wrongly, with private activity in the name of
public norms").
Furthermore, the New Jersey Supreme Court's determination that the BSA was a "place of
public accommodation" was based on sound precedent. The court noted, for example, that the
statute's applicability had historically been interpreted broadly, evinced by the state legislature's
amendment to the 1966 statute. Dale, 734 A.2d at 1210; see, e.g., Fraser v. Robin Dee Day
Camp, 210 A.2d 208 (NJ. 1965) (setting forth the rationale that the legislature later codified in
the 1966 Amendment). Moreover, the court's determination that a "place of public
accommodation" is not limited to a "place" was based on established case law. Dale, 734 A.2d
at 1209; see, e.g., United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764, 773 (Minn. 1981)
(approving a flexible construction of the term "place"); Nat'l Org. of Women v. Little League
Baseball, Inc., 338 A.2d 198 (NJ. 1974) (affirming that "the statutory noun 'place' ... is a term
of convenience, not of limitation"); United States Power Squadrons v. State Human Rights
Appeal Bd., 452 N.E.2d 1199, 1204 (N.Y. 1983) (holding that a "place of public
accommodation" need not be a fixed location). Having determined that the statute's
applicability was not limited to a "place," the court addressed whether the BSA was a "public
accommodation" by inquiring "whether the entity.., engages in broad public solicitation,
whether it maintains close relationships with the government or other public accommodations,
or whether it is similar to enumerated or other previously recognized public accommodations."
Dale, 734 A.2d at 1210. The court concluded that "[g]iven Boy Scouts' public solicitation
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exclusively on the BSA's allegation that the forced inclusion of Dale would
constitute significant state infiingement on the organization's ability to engage in
anti-gay expression.
147
In an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court addressed the BSA's
expressive association defense under the analytic framework set forth in the
Roberts trilogy. Applying the first prong of the framework, the Court inquired
whether the "group ... engage[d] in some form of expression, whether it be
public or private.' '14 Reviewing the Scout Oath and Law, the Court found that
"the general mission of the Boy Scouts is clear: 'To instill values in young
people.""149 The Court concluded that an association seeking to transmit such a
system of values undisputedly engaged in expression.1
50
Given that the BSA engaged in expressive activity, the Court addressed the
secondary issue of whether the New Jersey statute significantly affected the
organization's ability to advocate that expression.15' This consideration required
the Court to explore the nature of the BSA's view of homosexuality.
5 2
Consulting the BSA brief, the Court observed that the organization "teaches that
homosexual conduct is not morally straight" and declared that "[w]e accept the
Boy Scouts' assertion ... [and] need not inquire further to determine the nature of
the Boy Scouts' expression with respect to homosexuality.' ' i5 3 Nevertheless, the
activities, and considering its close relationship with governmental entities, it is not surprising
that Boy Scouts resembles many of the recognized and enumerated places of public
accommodation." Id. at 1213.
14 6 The absence of an intimate association analysis from the majority's opinion likely
reflects the Court's view that such claims brought by large organizations are effectively futile.
See, e.g., New York State Club Ass'n. v. New York, 487 U.S. 1, 12 (1988) (holding that the
statute's regular meal service and nonmember payment requirements were "at least as
significant in defining the nonprivate nature of these associations" as the characteristics of the
organizations in Roberts and Duarte); Duarte, 481 U.S. at 548 (concluding that Rotary
International was "not the kind of intimate or private relation that warrants constitutional
protection" in its size, purpose, and selectivity); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,
621 (1984) (determining that the Jaycees lacked the distinctive characteristics sufficient to
invoke First Amendment protection). Perhaps most telling of the Court's view in this regard
was the categorical rejection of such claims brought by large organizations in Justice
O'Connor's concurrence in Roberts. 468 U.S. at 631 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[T]he
Jaycees cannot claim a right of association deriving from this Court's cases concerning
'marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and
education.'... Whatever the precise scope of the rights recognized in such cases, they do not
encompass associational rights of a 295,000-member organization... .") (quoting Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (citation omitted)).
147Dale, 530 U.S. at 646-63.
141Id. at 648.1491d. at 649.
"OKld. at 650 (citing Roberts to support the proposition that "[i]t seems indisputable that an
association that seeks to transmit such a system of values engages in expressive activity").
151 id.
152Id. Significantly, the Dale Court noted that the examination of the BSA's expressive
content required inquiry only "to a limited extent." Id.
15 3 Id. at 651. By contrast, the Girl Scouts of America (GSA) "lets each of the 317 local
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Court accepted the terms "morally straight" and "clean" in the Scout Oath and
Law as "written evidence of the Boy Scouts' viewpoint, ... if only on the
question of the sincerity of the professed beliefs."' 54 Although noting that
different people would attribute very different meanings to "morally straight" and
"clean," the Court in no uncertain terms accepted the BSA's contention that
homosexual conduct is contrary to the values embodied in such language.
55
Citing Hurley, the Court then concluded that "[a]s the presence of GLIB in
Boston's St. Patrick's Day parade would have interfered with the parade
organizers' choice not to propound a particular point of view, the presence of
Dale as an assistant scoutmaster would just as surely interfere with the Boy
Scout's choice not to propound a point of view contrary to its beliefs."'
56
In the final stage of the analysis, the Court held that the substantial
infingement created by Dale's presence was not justified by a compelling state
interest.157 Distinguishing the compelling interests found in the Roberts trilogy,
the Court noted that the state action in those cases did "not materially interfere
with the ideas that the organization sought to express., 158 Absent from the divided
Court's opinion,159 however, was any reference to whether the protection of
councils decide [discrimination policies] for itself." Peg Tyre, For the Girls, a Different Policy,
NEWSWEEK, August 6, 2001, at 51, 51. Nevertheless, "the [GSA's] national policy claims to
prohibit discrimination against homosexuals," although "local councils are not automatically
dechartered if they do." Id.
'54Dale, 530 U.S. at 651.
1551d. Although the plain language of Dale fails to explicitly regulate public morality,
"[o]ne must question ... whether the Court would have reached the same result in Dale if the
Boy Scouts held the belief that only Caucasians were 'morally straight."' J. Banning Jasiunas,
Note, Is ENDA the Answer? Can a "Separate but Equal" Federal Statute Adequately Protect
Gays and Lesbians from Employment Discrimination?, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1529, 1545 (2000).
Presuming the Court would not defer to an organization's contention that only Caucasians were
"morally straight," its decision to defer to the BSA's claim that homosexuals were not "morally
straight" is a selective determination. The Court's exercise of such selectivity, in turn,
effectively adopts the organization's views to which it grants deference.156Dale, 530 U.S. at 654. The Court also stated that "[a]lthough we did not explicitly deem
the parade in Hurley an expressive association, the analysis we applied there is similitr to the
analysis we apply here." Id. at 659.
'
57 Id. at 658-59.
158 Id. at 658.
159One critic has suggested that Justice Stevens, who wrote the dissent in Dale, "began
with a majority.., but was forced to tum it into a dissent when he lost one vote shortly before
the end of [the] Term." The evidence consisted of five factors:
(I) [A]Ithough each Justice ordinarily has at least one majority opinion per sitting, Justice
Stevens had no majority opinion for the April 2000 sitting (the only such instance all
Term); (2) Justice Stevens's dissent looks very much like a hastily-converted majority
opinion, with a long factual section and relatively few references to the majority opinion;
(3) the Chief already had the Dickerson majority for that month, and it would have been
unusual to keep two important opinions from one sitting; (4) the syllabus to the Chiefs
opinion is a one-paragraph drill, lacking the usual careful substructure, suggesting it was
done in a rush....
John P. Elwood, What Were They Thinking: The Supreme Court in Revue, October Term 1999,
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homosexuals constituted a lesser state interest than the "compelling interest" that
Roberts and Duarte found in protecting women.
160
C. The Dale Approach: A Critique
Dale marked the first time the Court recognized the right to discriminate as a
component of expressive association. Given the precedent set forth by the
Roberts trilogy, however, Dale raises concerns at virtually every stage of its
analysis.162 This section argues the Dale Court erred in concluding that (1) the
BSA maintained an anti-gay expressive message, (2) Dale's presence in the BSA
infringed upon that message, and (3) such infiingement was not justified by a
compelling state interest.
1. The Enigmatic Anti-Gay Message in "Morally Straight" and "Clean"
The Dale Court grounded its determination that the BSA engaged in anti-gay
expression on the group's contention that homosexual conduct is inconsistent
with the terms "morally straight" and "clean."16' This contention, however, is
contradicted by the plain language of the Scout Handbook, which defines
"morally straight":
To be a person of strong character, guide your life with honesty, purity, and
justice. Respect and defend the rights of all people. Your relationships with
others should be honest and open. Be clean in your speech and actions, and
faithful in your religious beliefs. The values you follow as a Scout will help you
4 GREEN BAG 2d 27,31 (2000).
160That is, the Court's basis for rejecting the contention that the New Jersey statute served
a compelling state interest was not that the statutes in Roberts and Duarte protected women,
subject to intermediate scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment, whereas the statute in Dale
protected homosexuals, subject to a mere rationality standard.
161 As Professor Carrington has noted, the Court has never before recognized "a right to
associate for the purpose of achieving discrimination against embattled groups." Carrington,
supra note 1, at 1188. Moreover, the "New Jersey law that the Court invalidated can hardly be
viewed as an expression of majoritarian tyranny indifferent to the interest and welfare of a
beleaguered minority represented by the Scouts. The Scouts have full recourse to the political
process to correct the problem if indeed the people of New Jersey perceive that there is one."
Id.; see also Dale, 530 U.S. at 679 ("[U]ntil today, we have never once found a claimed right to
associate in the selection of members to prevail in the face of a State's antidiscrimination law.')
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
62 Lary Cata Backer, Disciplining Judicial Interpretation of Fundamental Rights: First
Amendment Decadence in Southworth and Boy Scouts ofAmerica and European Alternatives,
36 TULSA L.J. 117, 121 (2000) (stating that Dale provides "a stunning illustration of the
decadent and baroque qualities of constitutional adjudication that is slowly sapping the vigor of
juridical authority to interpret our 'Basic Law"); Carrington, supra note 1 ("[Tjhere is
unseemliness in the Court's fashioning a constitutional right of the Boy Scouts to exclude
homosexual scoutmasters .... To find this restraint in the text of the First Amendment is more
than a stretch....').
163 See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
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become virtuous and self-reliant.164
The Handbook elaborates on the meaning of the phrase:
In any consideration of moral fitness, a key word has to be "courage." A boy's
courage to do what his head and his heart tell him is right And the courage to
refuse to do what his heart and his head say is wrong. Moral fitness, like
emotional fitness, will clearly present opportunities for wise guidance by an alert
Scoutmaster.
165
Thus, neither the plain language of "morally straight' nor its definition in the
Scout Handbook references the organization's view on homosexual conduct or
sexuality in general. To the contrary, the Handbook's definition further reveals
the BSA's pluralistic and open-minded nature in its suggestion that members be
"honest and open--a virtue that when "courageously" displayed by James Dale
induced the very organization that encouraged such truthfulness and courage to
exclude him.
Similarly, the Scout Handbook's reference to the term "clean" lacks any
expressive or implicit message regarding homosexuality. The Handbook explains:
A Scout is CLEAN. A Scout keeps his body and mindfit and clean. He chooses
the company of those who live by these same ideals. He helps keep his home and
community clean .... Swear words, profanity, and dirty stories are weapons that
ridicule other people and hurt their feelings. The same is true of racial slurs and
jokes making fun of ethnic groups or people with physical or mental limitations.
A Scout knows there is no kindness or honor in such mean-spirited behavior. He
avoids it in his own words and deeds. He defends those who are targets of
insults.166
Neither the BSA's mission statement nor its official membership policy
reflected further elaboration on the meaning of "clean." Indeed, as Justice Stevens
noted in dissent, "[i]t is plain as the light of day that... 'clean' [does not] say[]
the slightest thing about homosexuality.'
' 67
Moreover, although the Rehnquist majority attempted to disconnect itself
from such an attenuated inference of the terms "morally straight" and "clean" by
deferring to the BSA's interpretation, 16 such a judicial approach is problematic in
at least two respects. First, this ostensible display of judicial restraint encourages
organizational leaders to include ambiguous language in their charters and
handbooks.' 69 This language may then be broadly interpreted to comprehend a
164BoYScouTs OFAMERICA, BoY ScouT HANDBOOK 551 (10th ed. 1990).
165 Id. at 239-40.
166Id. at 561.
'
67 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640,668 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).68 Id. at 661 ("We are not, as we must not be, guided by our views of whether the Boy
Scouts' teachings with respect to homosexual conduct are right or wrong.").
169 As Justice Stevens noted in dissent:
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seemingly infinite number of meanings, thereby allowing organizations to
insulate themselves from anti-discrimination laws. The Dale dissent recognized
this precise concern, noting that "[i]f this Court were to defer to whatever position
an organization is prepared to assert in its briefs, there would be no way to mark
the proper boundary between genuine exercises of the right to associate ... and
sham claims that are simply attempts to insulate nonexpressive private
discrimination .... 117o
Second, the Dale Court's deferential approach increases the danger of
organizational leaders171 suggesting expressive values that, in fact, differ from
those of its members. 72 Although "the First Amendment... does not require that
This is an astounding view of the law. I am unaware of any previous instance in which our
analysis of the scope of a constitutional right was determined by looking at what a litigant
asserts in his or her brief and inquiring no further. It is even more astonishing in the First
Amendment area, because, as the majority itself acknowledges, "we are obligated to
independently review the factual record." It is an odd form of independent review that
consists of deferring entirely to whatever a litigant claims. But the majority insists that our
inquiry must be "limited," because "it is not the role of the courts to reject a group's
expressed values because they disagree with those values or find them internally
inconsistent."
Id. at 686 (citations omitted).
"Ol1d. at 687.
171The religious and ideological composition of the BSA leadership has come under close
scrutiny in the wake of Dale:
[O]bservers say Mormons exercise unparalleled clout over the national board, which for
years was sprinkled with top executives from Eastern firms and now attracts mostly
conservative civil leaders tied to the churches that sponsor troops. Before the Supreme
Court ruling the Salt Lake City-based church threatened to break away from the fold if
forced to tolerate homosexuals. Such a move would devastate scouting, a ranking leader
says. "There is unadulterated fear that they're going to bail out, that they're going to start
their own program," says the Scout leader, vho requested anonymity. "The Mormons
have all the cards."
France, supra note 135, at 48-49.
172Numerous members of the BSA, for example, testified that they were unaware of the
organization's purported anti-gay expression. See, e.g., Dale, 530 U.S. at 675-76 n.7 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). An ex-Boy Scout whose children were young Scouts and was himself an
assistant and a merit badge counselor stated, for example, that "I never heard and am not aware
of any discussion about homosexuality that occurred during any Scouting meeting or
function .... Prior to September 1991, 1 never heard any mention whatsoever of homosexuality
during any Scouting function." Id.; see also Backer, supra note 162, at 140 ("It is hard for
anyone with a memory to think of the Boy Scouts of America as an organization whose
expressive purpose was to stamp out homosexuality.").
Moreover, numerous Scouts were not only unaware of the BSA's stance on homosexuals,
but affirmatively protested against it. Ninety-three boys in the Montclair, New Jersey Cub Scout
Pack, for example, signed a petition against the anti-gay rule. Claudia Kolker, Boy Scouts
Pledge to Persevere Opposition to Ban on Gays, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2000, at A2. Similarly,
"[n]ot everyone on the Yankee Boy Scouts Council board of directors agreed with the national
policy." Richard Weizel, In Hopes of Reviving Donations, A Pamphlet, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11,
2001, at 14. Attorney John Andres, who assisted in drafting a local BSA position paper, also
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every member of a group agree on every issue in order for the group's policy to
be 'expressive association,"" 73 Roberts dictates that state interference is only
unconstitutional when it infinges upon a group's "collective effort on behalf of
[its] shared goals."'74 At best, "there is no indication of any shared goal of
teaching that homosexuality is incompatible with being 'morally straight' and
'clean." 1 75 At worst the anti-gay message suggested by BSA officials is at odds
attempted to convince the national group to change its policy. Id.
The backlash to the BSA's anti-gay campaign intensified in the month that followed Dale.
The front-page of The New York Times reported that "corporate and governmental support for
the organization has slipped markedly." Kate Zemike, Scouts' Successful Ban on Gays Is
Followed by Loss in Support, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 29, 2000, at Al; see also Andrew Jacobs, The
Supreme Court: The Reaction; Victory Has Consequences of Its Own, N.Y. TIMES, June 29,
2000, at A28 (noting that the "aggressive legal campaign to exclude gay leaders has provoked
disenchantment from religious groups, school boards and parent volunteers around the
country"). The Los Angeles Times also ran a front-page story on the diminishing support for the
BSA, noting that "the national organization has endured a forest fire of protests from cities,
charities, even some Scout troops themselves." Kolker, supra. Additionally, The Wall Street
Journal reported that "[s]ome of the biggest backers of the Boy Scouts of America are
withdrawing their support from the group following [the] ... wake of a Supreme Court ruling
that upholds their longtime policy of excluding gay scouts. At least three big corporate
sponsors-including Chase Manhattan Corp. and Knight Ridder Inc.-are pulling or
considering cutting... support." Daniel Costello, Some Backers Pull Boy Scouts'Funding after
High Court's Ruling on Gay Scouts, WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 2000, at B7. Most recently, Oscar-
winning producer and director Steven Spielberg, who gained the BSA's highest honor of Eagle
Scout, resigned from his position on the advisory board after ten years of service, stating "[t]he
last few years in Scouting have deeply saddened me to see the Boy Scouts of America activity
and publicly participating in discrimination." Spielberg Quits Scout Post over Anti-Gay Policy,
LA. TIMEs, April 17,2001, at B2.
In addition, a wide variety of public, corporate, and religious entities that once affiliated
themselves with the BSA joined a "growing effort to block local chapters from meeting in
places like public schools and state campgrounds .... " Zemike, supra, at A16. "[A]t least
4,418 schools nationwide have ended preferential relationships with the Scouts," France, supra
note 135, at 47, and many major cities, such as Chicago and San Francisco, no longer allow
BSA programs during school hours. Id. at Al (correction article on September 6, 2000). Many
corporations, including Textron, Chase Manhattan Bank, and the United Way, have withdrawn
millions of dollars otherwise donated to local and national scouting groups nationwide. Id.;
France, supra note 135, at 47 ("About 44 of the most affluent chapters of the United Way-one
of the scouting's biggest funders--have blocked additional support... ."); see id. ("Levi
Strauss, Wells Fargo, Fleet Bank and CVS, along with the Philadelphia Foundation and
Communications Workers of America, have taken steps to distance themselves [from the
BSA].'). Finally, numerous religious leaders have requested that parents withdraw their
children from the BSA, arguing that the BSA's purported views are "incompatible with [the]
consistent belief that every individual--regardless of his or her sexual orientation-is created in
the image of God and is deserving of equal treatment." Laurie Goodstein, Jewish Group
Recommends Cutting Ties to Boy Scouts, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 10, 2001, at A12; see France, supra
note 135, at 46 ("[T]he United Church of Christ, along with Baptist and Episcopal
congregations, have asked the Scouts to reconsider.").
17Dale, 530 U.S. at 655.
74 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) (emphasis added).
'"Dale, 530 U.S. at 675 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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with the group's shared goals of diversity and non-selectivity.
2. The "Significant Burden" ofDale's Presence
Given the BSA's contention that homosexuality is inconsistent with the
organization's expressive activities, the Court concluded that Dale's continued
membership significantly infringed the members' ability to carry out those
activities. 176 Prior cases had suggested, however, that the mere presence of an
unwanted individual in an organization engaging in non-advocacy related activity
failed to constitute such infringement.17 7 In Roberts, for example, the Court
concluded that the Minnesota statute "require[d] no change in the Jaycees' creed
of promoting the interests of young men, and it impose[d] no restrictions on the
organization's ability to exclude individuals with ideologies or philosophies
different from those of its existing members.' ' 7 8 In addition, the Duarte Court
determined that the California statute did "not require the clubs to
abandon... their basic goals of humanitarian service, high ethical standards in all
vocations, good will, and peace. Nor does it require them to abandon their
classification system or admit members who do not reflect a cross section of the
community."'
179
Similarly, Dale's continued membership in the BSA would fail to
significantly affect the organization's expressive purposes. The BSA neither
instructs scouts to engage in anti-gay expression nor encourages its scoutmasters
to convey such views.8 More importantly, the record was void of any evidence
that Dale had in the past, or would in the future, use his leadership position as a
pulpit for the promulgation of homosexual ideas.'8 Indeed, neither the article
identifying Dale as the co-president of the Gay-Lesbian Alliance nor the other
extracurricular activities in which Dale participated associated him with the
'
76 Seesupra notes 154-59.
77See, e.g., Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 548
(1987) (concluding that the inclusion of women did not "affect in any significant way the
existing members' ability to carry out their various purposes"); Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627. Note
that the Roberts trilogy and Dale are not distinguishable on the basis that the trilogy involved
the exclusion of members, whereas Dale involved the exclusion of an organization leader.
Indeed, "[t]h6 duties of neither an assistant scoutmaster nor a Boy Scout member include
teaching, learning, or discussing the topic of homosexuality." Stephen P. Warren, Note, Of
Merit Badges and Sexual Orientation: The New Jersey Supreme Court Balances the Law
Against Discrimination and the Freedom of Association in Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 30
SETON HALL L. REV. 951, 985 (2000). Moreover, the BSA acknowledged that the terms
"member" and "leader" are "interchangeable" for all adults affiliated with the organization. As
a result, "if the Boy Scouts of America can be required to readmit Dale as a member, similarly
forcing the Boy Scouts of America to reappoint Dale to his assistant scoutmaster position does
not violate the freedom of association." Id. at 986.
7 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627.
179Duarte, 481 U.S. at 548.
0so See supra notes 133-37.
81 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 689 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Furthermore, the Dale Court's analogy to Hurley renders its holding even
more tenuous.183 By the Court's own admission, Hurley held that the
Massachusetts statute's "peculiar" application interfered with the parade
sponsors' pure speech rather than its right to expressive association.'8 4 As a result,
the Hurley Court departed from the expressive association framework and more
aptly addressed the state interference in the context of traditional First
Amendment analysis. 8 Hurley, therefore, fails to address the identity-based
discrimination at issue in Dale.
Moreover, a closer examination of Hurley, in fact, undermines the Dale
decision. In dicta, the Hurley Court "distinguished between the members of
GLIB, who marched as a unit to express their views about their own sexual
orientation, on the one hand, and homosexuals who might participate as
individuals in the parade without intending to express anything about their
sexuality by doing so.' 18 6 The Court noted that the latter would avoid the
problematic aspects of the former given that the pure speech of the parade
organizers would no longer be implicated.' 87 Dale, as an individual not intending
to express his sexuality in BSA activities, is thus more appropriately analogized to
the individual participants than the organizational unit that marched to express
their views on homosexuality.'88
182 Id.
183 One scholar predicted Hurley's faulty application before the Dale decision, noting that
although the Hurley Court "implicitly de-emphasize[d] the importance of the Roberts approach,
[Hurley] may have fateful implications for attempts to use antidiscrimination law to eliminate
private exclusion of gays and others." Andrew R. Varcoe, The Boy Scouts and the First
Amendment: Constitutional Limits on the Reach of Anti-Discrimination Law, 9 LAW & SEx.
163, 192 (2000).
18Seesupra note 118.
185 Id.; Backer, supra note 162. Backer notes that the Dale majority "stretches to make new
constitutional doctrine by the process of analogy. This time, the object was to stretch the
relevance and utility ofHurley... ." Id. at 136.
186 Dale, 530 U.S. at 694 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 572-73 (1995)).
187More precisely, the GLIB's views "would likely be perceived" as the parade
organizers' own speech, whereas the individual marchers posed no such threat when they
participated separately. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 575.8Justice Souter stated at oral argument that "[tihe problem in simply drawing a parallel to
Hurley is that we're not at the point where anyone is using the Boy Scouts, or proposing to use
the Boy Scouts for expression." Appellant's Oral Argument, Transcript at 22-25, Boy Scouts
of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (No. 99-699). Although counsel for the BSA replied that
"he put a banner around his neck when he... got himself into the newspaper," this contention
disregards the fact that, under the same theory, individual gay and lesbian marchers in the St.
Patrick's Day parade would have also put a banner around their necks--a proposition the
Hurley Court flatly rejected. Id.
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3. The Non-Compelling Interest ofEradicating Discrimination
Based on Sexual Orientation
In the final stage of its analysis, the Court concluded that the substantial
infringement created by Dale's presence was not outweighed by a compelling
state interest.'89 Although this consideration entails a balance between the state
interest in eradicating discrimination and the severity of the infringement upon the
organization's expression,190 the Dale Court focused exclusively on the degree of
state infringement on the BSA's expression. As a result, the Court's basis for
rejecting the contention that the New Jersey statute served a compelling state
interest was not that, unlike the protection of women in Roberts and Duarte, the
statute in Dale protected homosexuals.19' Rather, the Dale Court determined that
the application of the statute in Dale "materially interfere[d] with the ideas that
the organization sought to express."'
92
The Dale Court's exclusive focus on the degree of infringement, however,
effectively disregards the balancing component required in determining whether
substantial infiingement is outweighed by a compelling state interest. Indeed, the
Court's indifference to the state interest served by the statute in Dale is at odds
with Roberts and Duarte, in which public accommodation statutes were found to
"plainly serve[ ] compelling state interests of the highest order."' 93 The Court
noted in those decisions that "acts of invidious discrimination in the distribution
of publicly available goods, services, and other advantages cause unique evils that
1)194government has a compelling interest to prevent ....
'
8 9Seesupra notes 159-62.
' gOSee supra note 64.
19' Although the Court's explicit basis for rejecting New Jersey's compelling state interest
argument was not the class of citizens protected by the statute, this distinction may very well
have been the motivation for the Court's decision. See Jasiunas, supra note 155, at 1544 ("[T]he
Court's reasoning is instructive as to ... the way that the Court treats sexual orientation
differently from other classes protected under anti-discrimination laws.").
192Dale, 530 U.S. at 658.
'
93Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987); Roberts
v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 624 (1984); see Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together:
The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1, 64 (2000) (noting the potentially
"puzzling and problematic" distinction between the Jaycees implicated in the Roberts litigation
and the BSA). Moreover, the Court has expressly concluded that the protection of homosexuals
against inequitable treatment falls within the states' general authority to eradicate invidious
discrimination. In Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1995), for example, the Court held that
"orientation antidiscrimination laws are not 'special rights' for homosexuals but are, instead,
legitimate state efforts to assure GLBT people the same public space that straight people
routinely enjoy." William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay
Discourse and the Channeling Effect ofJudicialReview, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1327, 1410 (2000)
(quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 632).
194Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628. In addition, the New Jersey statute achieves this compelling
interest through least-restrictive and content-neutral means. Indeed, the BSA made no claim to
the over-inclusive nature of the statute, save for its intended prohibition of discrimination based
on sexual orientation. Moreover, the Court unanimously reaffirmed that such anti-
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IV. DEGENERATION OF STATES' REGULATORY AUTHORITY TO PREVENT
DISCRIMINATION IN PLACES OF PUBLIC ACCOMMODATION:
THE AFTERMATH OF DALE
The criticisms offered in Part III raise concerns not only with respect to
Dale's long-term stability, but also to its present-day legitimacy in authorizing the
discrimination of homosexuals and suppressing the civil rights authority of state
governments.1 95 This section envisions a theoretical state of affairs in the
aftermath of Dale, exploring both the breadth of discrimination authorized under
its holding and the corresponding limitation on states' civil rights authority.196 An
appreciation for the severity of this limitation, however, first requires a
comprehension of the states' function in undermining invidious discrimination.
A. The States 'Role in Preventing Invidious Discrimination
The function of state governments in eradicating invidious discrimination
follows two lines of interpretation. One line of interpretation contends that states
assume a responsibility in falsifying stereotypes and ameliorating prejudice. The
other asserts that states merely maintain the authority to take such measures if
they choose to do so. Although this debate is ultimately of only modest
significance for purposes of this note, the following sections address each in turn
to illustrate Dale's limitation on states' civil rights authority under each theory.
1. The Affirmative Responsibility of State Governments
in Ameliorating Discrimination
Scholars and jurists alike have recognized an obligation of states in
undermining invidious discrimination. 97 Professor William Eskridge, for
example, has asserted that although "[t]he state cannot, either practically or
constitutionally, require people to abandon stereotypes or prejudices,... state
policies can contribute to or undermine this social process." 198 This capacity to
undermine discrimination, in turn, becomes an obligation when "the state [has]
pervasively contributed to [the discriminatory] status quo, with its... stereotypes
discrimination legislation is content-neutral and unrelated to speech in Wisconsin v. Mitchell,
508 U.S. 476,484-85 (1993).
195 See supra notes 18-25 and accompanying text.
19 6Dale's impact on states' civil rights authority has particular significance for the
numerous jurisdictions that prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation. See, e.g., CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-81d (West 2001); D.C. CODEANN. § 1-2519 (2001); HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 368-1 (Michie 2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 98 (West 2001); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 363.03 (West 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-3 (West 2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-24-2
(2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4502 (2001); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 106.54 (West2001).
'
97 See infra notes 198-203.
'
98Eskridge, supra note 193.
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and prejudices."' 99 Under these circumstances, Eskridge contends, "even liberal
conceptions of the state support an affirmative state responsibility to
assure... people conditions under which they have a chance to falsify stereotypes
and ameliorate prejudice." 20°
In addition, the Roberts trilogy repeatedly suggested the affirmative duty of
states in protecting the civil rights of their citizens.201 In Roberts, for example, the
Court held that "acts of invidious discrimination in the distribution of publicly
available goods, services, and other advantages cause unique evils that
government has a compelling interest to prevent-wholly apart from the point of
view such conduct may transmit."202 Similarly, the Duarte Court found that the
eradication of discrimination in places of public accommodation "plainly serves
compelling state interests of the highest order."203 The compelling state interest in
assuring the equal treatment of every citizen thus implies an inherent activist
approach to states' civil rights authority.
2. The Voluntary Authority of State Governments
in Ameliorating Discrimination
The alternative interpretation of states' role in undermining discrimination is
that of a voluntary, rather than affirmative, nature.204 The Constitution's federalist
approach, largely embodied in the Tenth Amendment, reserves to the states the
ability to regulate solely on the basis that the regulation promotes the safety,
health, or general welfare of the citizenry.20 5 Pursuant to this authority, states'
ability to enact legislation prohibiting the invidious discrimination of their citizens
has been universally accepted, notwithstanding constitutional or congressional
provisions to the contrary.20 6 The voluntary theory holds that states, and
ultimately the electorate, are free from obligation to adopt statutory prohibitions
of discrimination.
One example of a political philosophy supporting such an interpretation is
Jeremy Benthem's theory of utilitarianism.207 State government adherence to the
utilitarian theory "favors state promotion of the good when it would help more
people than it would hurt" 208 Thus, if a state government assumes that
199Id.2 00 id.
20 See, e.g., New York State Club, 487 U.S. at 14 n.5; Duarte, 481 U.S. at 549; Roberts,
468 U.S. at 624.
202 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628.
2 03 Id. at 624.
204The term "voluntary" in this context denotes only a non-affirmative duty of state
governments to enact civil rights legislation.
20'U.S. CONST. amend. X.206 See id.
207 See Jeremy Bentham, Offences Against One's Self Paederasty (pts. 1 & 2), reprinted in
3 J. OFHoMosExuALrY 389 (1978), 4 J. OFHOMOSExUALnY 91 (1978).
201 Eskridge, supra note 193, at 1373. Eskridge similarly applied Benthem's theory to the
regulatorypower of state governments in eradicating discrimination. Id.
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heterosexuality is "better" than homosexuality, the legislature should enact anti-
gay policies because "the happiness they bring to a large segment of our society
outweighs the distress they cause for the smaller group of gay people."20 9
Accordingly, Benthem's utilitarian theory requires a voluntary interpretation of
states' civil rights authority that does not mandate the protection of minority
groups.
3. The Impact of Dale on Both the Affirmative and Voluntary Theories
The import in distinguishing between the affirmative and voluntary theories
of states' civil rights authority lies in understanding Dale's impact on both
theories. On one hand, Dale's impact on the affirmative duty to undermine
discrimination hinders a responsibility, On the other, Dale's impact on the mere
capacity to undermine such discrimination eliminates a choice. The key is that
Dale's legalization of discrimination limits states' civil rights authority
irrespective of the debate.
B. The Extent ofDale's Limitation on States' Civil Rights Authority
The following sections generally illustrate the types of discriminatory
practices seemingly permitted under Dale's analytic framework through the use
of two hypothetical situations. The first of these situations closely parallels the
facts of Dale, attempting to demonstrate that even the most palpable form of
discrimination authorized by the decision--discrimination based on sexual
orientation-reveals a fatal defect in the Dale Court's analysis. The second
hypothetical explores the broad extent to which Dale impacts the civil rights not
only of homosexuals, but of other classes of citizens subject to discrimination.
1. Hypothetical #1: Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation
Evanston, Illinois, is home to a private, nonprofit organization of business
men and women. Comprised of nearly one million members worldwide and
located in over one hundred different countries, the organization constitutes one
of the largest occupational associations in the world. Its expressive purpose, as
noted in its "Manual of Procedure," is simple: "To provide humanitarian service,
encourage high ethical standards in all vocations, and help build goodwill and
peace in the world." Neither its board of directors nor any of its members have
ever understood the organization to engage in anti-gay expression. Indeed, the
organization prides itself on its wide range of personal and occupational
representation.
Recently, two leaders of a local branch began excluding avowed homosexual
members solely on the basis of their sexual orientation. In response, the excluded
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statutory prohibition of discrimination based on sexual orientation in places of
public accommodation. The organization's board of directors, concerned with
potential liability, convened to determine the most effective legal strategy. After
extensive deliberation, the board concluded that the organization would
affirmatively defend against the allegation on the theory that the statute violates
the organization's right of expressive association by virtue of homosexual
conduct being inconsistent with the values embodied in the phrase "high ethical
standards," as noted in the Manual of Procedure.
a. Application of the Dale Rationale
In the wake of Dale, the organization prevails on this theory. The reviewing
court, applying the first prong of the analytic framework, would determine the
organization engages in sufficient expression to invoke the First Amendment
given that "[i]t seems indisputable that an association that seeks to transmit such a
system of values engages in expressive activity."210 In conducting the second
prong of the analysis, the court would also conclude that the statute significantly
infringed upon this expression. Although this determination would require the
reviewing court to explore the "nature of the [organization's] view of
homosexuality,"2n the reviewing court "need not inquire further to determine the
nature of the [organization's] expression with respect to homosexuality" beyond
the "written evidence" of the organization's viewpoint in its Manual of
Procedure.2 12 Finally, the Court would conclude that the state's interests in
eradicating discrimination based on sexual orientation, identical to those rejected
in Dale, would "not justify such a severe intrusion on the [organization's] right[]
to freedom of expressive association."
213
b. Dale's Fatal Flaw
This theoretical situation is, to some extent, based on two realities. First, the
characteristics attributed to the hypothetical organization are those of Rotary
International-the association involved in the Duarte litigation. Second, the
discriminatory practices involved in the hypothetical situation are tailored to the
facts of Dale. Yet this hypothetical situation illuminates a concern that neither
Duarte nor Dale reveals standing alone; that is, even assuming the organization
does not engage in its purported expression,214 Dale requires the reviewing court
to rule as if it did.
Perhaps more important, however, is the reason the reviewing court's
210 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 650 (2000).2 1 1id.
212Id. at 651.
213Id. at 659.
214 Indeed, the outside observer may only speculate whether BSA members sincerely
engaged in anti-gay expression, whereas the hypothetical imputes the outside observer with the
knowledge that the purported expression is insincere.
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protection of the hypothetical organization appears more troubling than the Dale
Court's protection of the BSA. Simply stated, the hypothetical organization
alleged to engage in expressive values that unquestionably differed from those of
its members. Dale, by contrast, presented a factual pattern in which the Court, and
ultimately the reader of its opinion, was left to speculate as to whether the anti-
gay views professed by the BSA truly represented those of its constituency. This
distinction makes clear the conflict between the normative and descriptive
conjectures of expressive association: although an organization's sincerity should
be of primary consideration when determining questions of expressive
association, the existing framework effectively disregards it.
c. Conclusions: Hypothetical #1
This section demonstrates the danger in broadly deferring to an
organization's ostensible expression when granting First Amendment protection.
Yet the organization's fraudulent activity in the hypothetical situation may have
taken numerous forms. Organizational leaders may have surreptitiously included
language similar to "morally straight" and "clean" in their bylaws with the sole
purpose of minimizing future liability. Similarly, group leaders may have
intentionally included such language in their handbooks as a "license" to
discriminate. Indeed, the hypothetical situation involved the examination of
bylaws for language supporting the discriminatory practices for which the
organization was being sued--ex post. Yet in each of these cases, the rights of
those protected by the First Amendment-the members-is never contemplated.
2. Hypothetical #2: The Breadth ofDiscrimination Permitted
Interested in community development, an ambitious young college student
joined a national civic organization's local chapter in St. Paul, Minnesota.
Assuming an active role in the organization, she began developing programs for
adolescent members, recruiting through promotional materials, and participating
in a wide range of activities at the local, state, and national levels. After numerous
years of dedicated service, she received honorary membership for fostering a
"spirit of genuine Americanism and civic interest"'-the organization's purpose as
noted in its bylaws.
Soon thereafter, the woman became pregnant out of wedlock. Bedridden for
much of her pregnancy, she was unable to maintain many of her organizational
responsibilities, but again became active in the organization after the child's birth.
A local organizational leader, upon learning of her single motherhood, terminated
her membership based on his belief that unwed mothers did not promote a
positive role model to the organization's teenage girls. The young mother filed
suit in state court, alleging a violation of the state's statutory prohibition of
discrimination on the basis of both "marital" and "familial status" in places of
public accommodation.
Prior to trial, the organization's president and vice president assembled with
[Vol. 62:14731506
RESTORATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS AUTHORITY
counsel to discuss potential defenses to the allegation. After reviewing Dale, the
attorneys advised the organization to proceed on the theory that unwed pregnancy
and child rearing are inconsistent with the organization's expressive purpose to
foster the "civic interest," as noted in the organization's bylaws.
a. The Expansive Application of the Dale Rationale
The reviewing court, in accord with Dale, would again rule in favor of the
organization. Applying the first prong of expressive association analysis, the court
would determine that the organization engages in a form of expression protected
by the First Amendment because it transmits "a system of values." 215 In
determining the substance of this expression, moreover, the court need only
explore the nature of the organization's view of unwed mothers to the extent that
its leaders testified as such. Indeed, the court "need not inquire further to
determine the nature of the [organization's] expression" beyond the "instructive"
evidence of the organization's viewpoint in its bylaws.2 16 Finally, the reviewing
court would hold that the state's interest in eradicating the discrimination against
single parents does not outweigh the degree of state interference-identical to that
in Dale.2
17
b. Dale's Fatal Breadth
This hypothetical situation is again grounded on facts of existing case law.
The characteristics of the theoretical organization, for example, were those of the
Jaycees-the organization implicated in the Roberts litigation. In addition, the
hypothetical statute prohibiting discrimination based on marital and familial status
was the New Jersey public accommodation statute at issue in Dale. Indeed, even
the form of discrimination is tailored to the facts of Chambers v. Omaha Girls
Club,218 an Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in which an employer fired
the arts and crafts teacher of a local girls club because the teacher was pregnant
and unmarried.
219
The form of discrimination in the hypothetical, however, could have again
taken numerous forms. Under the same theory, for example, organizational
leaders could have instead excluded the child of the unwed mother or the spouse
of a same-sex marriage. Moreover, no safeguard exists to prevent the exclusion of
a child or spouse of an interracial marriage. In short, Dale's holding authorizes a
broad range of invidious discrimination extending beyond homosexuality.
220
215Dale, 530 U.S. at 649-51.216Id. at 651.
217Id.
21' 834 F.2d 697, 705 (1987) (upholding the firing of an unwed pregnant teacher because
she was not a "positive role model" for the teenage girls in the organization).219 
see id.
22See Estlund, supra note 193, at 62 (noting that Dale indirectly "limits the extent to
which voluntary associations can be counted on to foster connections across racial and ethnic
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Given this extensive authorization of exclusionary practices, therefore, the
prospect of incorporating our most vulnerable citizens into mainstream society
appears increasingly doubtful.221
c. Conclusions: Hypothetical #2
This section has illustrated two general themes, one prominent and the other
discrete. The prominent theme is the extensive breadth of Dale and the specific
forms of discrimination permissible under its holding. The discrete theme is
merely a reaffirmation of an earlier premise-namely, the ability of
organizational leaders to allege expressive values that differ from those of its
members. The challenge, therefore, is to establish a mechanism by which courts
may decipher the representative expressive purposes from the unrepresentative.
Part V provides one such mechanism.
V. PROPOSAL: AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION
The touchstone of expressive association is the protection of individual
liberty to associate for activities safeguarded by the First Amendment.
2 2
lines, and it implicitly shifts that crucial function onto those institutions such as the workplace
that are subject to regulations on behalf of equality').
221 See HARRY M. CLOR, OBSCENITY AND PUBLIC MORALITY 32 (1969). Clor argues that
laws may reduce the incidence of certain acts and thus prevent individuals from forming habits
they might otherwise form. Id. Accordingly, the absence of such legislation renders certain
practices more widespread, thereby contributing to society's sense that such conduct is
unobjectionable. Id.; see also Barbara J. Cox, But Why Not Marriage: An Essay on Vermont'
Civil Unions Law, Same-Sex Marriage, and Separate But (Un)Equal, 25 VT. L. REV. 113, 136
(2000). Cox notes:
[H]eterosexual institutions, such as the [B]oy [S]couts... make[] clear the fear and
discomfort that those demanding such separation feel. As long as sexual minorities are not
permitted to join these institutions, the heterosexism inherent in each will remain
unchecked. [This] would be the same as African-Americans accepting separate railroad
cars or women accepting separate educational institutions. By agreeing to separation, we
help them perpetuate their view of [homosexuals] as inferior.
Id.; see CHRISTOPHER WOLFF, JUDICIAL ACTIISM 59-60 (1996); Anna Gorman, Scout
Officials Support Court Decision on Gays; Morals: Gay and Lesbian Activists Register Dismay
that Homosexuals Can Be Banned fom Leading Boys' Troops, L.A. TIMES, June 29, 2000, at
B4 ("[P]rohibiting homosexual troop leaders perpetuates an invalid stereotype that all gay men
are pedophiles."); see also France, supra note 135, at 48. ("[BSA supporters] worry about
sexual abuse, despite the fact that gay authority figures don't pose a disproportionate threat to
kids."). Moreover, the American Medical Association warns that "stigmatizing homosexuality
can contribute to major depression and suicide among gay youth." Id. at 50.
2
=
2See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984) (noting that "[t]he
Constitution guarantees freedom of association of this kind as an indispensable means of
preserving other individual liberties," free association is implicated "when the State interferes
with individuals' selection of those with whom they wish to join in a common endeavor," and
that "the Bill of Rights is designed to secure individual liberty") (emphasis added).
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Enforcement of this right is founded on an organization's ability to articulate its
members' expressive values in a judicial forum. Yet the nexus between individual
members and the organization litigating on their behalf becomes attenuated when
group leaders purport to maintain values that, in fact, differ from those of its
constituency 2 23 In short, the contemporary framework of expressive association
gives little, if any, consideration to this issue.
224
The judicial disregard for potential discrepancies existing between the values
expressed by organizational litigants and those of its members is likely
attributable to two factors: first, the arduous, if not impossible, task of ascertaining
the expressive values held by each member; and second, the corresponding need
to determine the degree of member acquiescence necessary to render the
purported activity a legitimate form of group expression. This section provides an
alternative approach to expressive association that would (1) bridge the gulf
between an organization's suggested expressive values and those of its members;
(2) circumvent the need to discern the expressive values held by each member;
(3) alleviate the task of determining the degree of member conformity sufficient
to constitute legitimate group expression; and (4) render outcomes consistent with
established precedent.
225
A. The Reasonable Member
At its most fundamental level, the attenuated nexus between organizational
members and their representative litigants is attributable to the Court's deference
to the litigants' subjective beliefs. Many spheres of legal doctrine, by comparison,
presuppose a uniform, objective standard of behavior for determining questions of
liability or guilt.226 Because the "infinite variety of situations which may arise
makes it impossible to fix definite rules in advance for all conceivable human
conduct[,] '227  courts have created a fictitious being: the "reasonable
m See supra note 172 and accompanying text. The Court recognized this concern in
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990). In Austin, the Court upheld
the Michigan Campaign Finance Act, which prohibited corporations from using corporate
treasury funds for independent expenditures to support or oppose political candidates. The
Court distinguished corporations from other expressive organizations because the individual
members of corporations may disagree with the corporation's political agenda.
24 See Backer, supra note 162, at 140 (noting that Dale is one of a "growing line of
Supreme Court cases in which facts are stretched to suit the applicability of doctrine, in this case
a subsidiary doctrine of constitutional interpretation").
2As Professor Lawrence Lessig notes in a different context, the proper manner in which
to approach questions of constitutional protection is "to choose in a way that is faithful to the
choices of the past, to translate the commitments of the past into a fundamentally different
context. ... [T]he constitutional translator construct[s] an application that, though different from
the original application, has the same meaning in the current context as the original did in its
context." LAWRENCE LEssm, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 109 (1999).
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person"22--or, in the context of expressive association, the "reasonablemember."
1. The General Premise
Given Dale's problematic inquiry into the subjective beliefs of the
organizational litigants, the reasonable member approach provides an alternative
standard that objectively determines the validity of suggested organizational
expression. This approach inquires whether a reasonable member of that
organization understands the organization to engage in its purported
expression.? 9 Proper application of the reasonable member approach, however,
requires courts be cognizant that the inquiry is not concerned with the expression
of the reasonable member,230 but with the expression in which the reasonable
member understands the organization to engage.
2. Limited Application in the Analytic Framework
Application of the reasonable member in the analytic fiamework of
expressive association is limited to determining the content of the organization's
expression? 31 Thus, its relevance is restricted to either the first stage of the
228 id
229 One key component to the reasonable member approach is its objective inquiry into the
expression in which the reasonable member would have understood the organization to engage
before the commencement of litigation, thereby prohibiting a group from alleging fraudulent
expression ex post. In this way, the reasonable member approach is akin to the well-established
method of argumentation established by John Rawls, commonly referred to as the "veil of
ignorance." JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136 (1971). Rawls bases this theory on the
notion that decisions of justice should be made in the "original position"-a hypothetical
situation in which rational individuals, acting in their self-interest, perceive themselves as
choosing social rules before they enter society. The restriction on their decisions, however, is
the "veil of ignorance," which occludes individuals from knowing particular facts about
themselves, such as their social status, intelligence, age, race, and gender. Id. at 137. Individuals
so situated, Rawls argues, will objectively affirm the equality of basic rights by "nullifying] the
effects of specific contingencies which put men at odds and tempt them to exploit social and
natural circumstances to their own advance." Id. at 136.
230 Similarly, the reasonable member inquiry is not concemed with whether the reasonable
member agrees with the expression in which the organization engages. One scholar has noted,
for example, that "[t]he Scouts may be right to suppose that many parents would withdraw their
children from the movement if it appeared to shelter leaders proselytizing for homosexual
lifestyles." Carrington, supra note 1. Yet the reasonable member inquiry is indifferent toward
whether such parents would agree with the BSA's exclusion of homosexuals; rather the inquiry
is only concerned with whether parents-or, more precisely, the reasonable member-would
understand the organization to engage in such expression.
23 As applied to the facts of Dale, the reasonable member approach may be relevant in
two contexts. First, as described in this section, the reasonable member may be applied to
determine the expressive purpose of the BSA. Second, the approach may be applied merely as
means of interpreting ambiguous language in organizational documents, such as "morally
straight" and "clean." In the latter case, the proper inquiry is whether the reasonable member of
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framework, in which courts determine whether the organization engages in "some
form of expression,"23 or the second stage, in which courts determine whether
the challenged state action infringes upon that message. Yet its precise stage of
application will often be ill-defined given the interlocutory nature of these two
inquiries.
3. Conceptualization: The Scope of the Reasonable Member
The reasonable member is perhaps best expounded in terms of a fictitious
organizational member who comprehends a scope of the group's expressive
purpose. This scope is determined by a variety of factors, including the frequency
with which the expression is exercised, the conspicuousness with which the
organization engages in the expression, and the dissemination of information
concerning the expression to the constituency. Thus, when an organization alleges
infringement of its expressive values and those values are beyond the scope of the
reasonable member, the organization's claim fails. Alternatively, when an
organization asserts an infringement of its expressive values and those values are
consistent with the scope of the reasonable member, the purported expression is
validated and the reviewing court considers whether the challenged state
infringement significantly affects that expression.
4. Advantages to the Reasonable Member Approach
The reasonable member approach alleviates many of the theoretical and
pragmatic concerns raised by Dale. First, Dale illuminates the risk that
organizational litigants will claim expressive values that differ from those of its
members. Under the reasonable member approach, however, expressive values
not shared by a constituency will not represent the organization as a whole, as the
reasonable member would not so perceive the group's expression. Second, Dale
fashions the danger that individuals will unknowingly pledge to an organization
maintaining expressive values with which they disagree.2 33 Yet the reasonable
member approach permits both current and prospective members to avoid such
misguided allegiance because each member is effectively on notice of the
organization's expression as understood by the reasonable member.234 Finally,
the BSA would understand the terms "morally straight" and "clean" to constitute anti-gay
expression.
32Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000).233 See supra note 175; see also France, supra note 135, at 46 ("By the organization's own
internal polls, 30 percent of Scout parents don't support the current policy...."). Indeed, "at a
time when Girl Scouts, Boys & Girl Clubs and other youth groups are growing in popularity,"
membership in the BSA dropped 4.5% after the Dale litigation exposed the BSA's purported
anti-gay policy. Id. at 47.
Rabbai Menitoff, for example, was quoted by The New York Times as stating, "[b]eing
a Boy Scout really had an influence on my life,... [but] I felt it was untenable to support or be
part of an organization that discriminated against a group of people." Laurie Goodstein, Jewish
Group Recommends Cutting Ties to Boy Scouts, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 10, 2001, at A12. In addition,
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Dale illustrates that judicial consideration of each member's understanding of the
purported expression is implausible given the large number of members affiliated
to many organizations and the corresponding need to determine the degree of
member acquiescence sufficient for legitimate group expression. The reasonable
member approach, however, evades such problematic enterprises while indirectly
considering the views of individual members.
B. Application of the Reasonable Member
The reasonable member approach is also in harmony with the Court's
expressive association precedent. In Roberts, for example, the expressive activity
relied upon by the Jaycees was the exclusion of women. The Court presupposed
that members of the organization sincerely subscribed to this view because of its
obvious nature; that is, the organization's exclusion of women would have clearly
fallen within the scope of expressive values as understood by the reasonable
member of the Jaycees.
The Duarte Court likewise presupposed that Rotary Club members held
views in accord with those suggested by the organization-again, the exclusion of
women. This supposition is similarly attributable to the fact that the practice of
excluding women was so prevalent as to plainly come within the scope of
expressive values comprehended by the reasonable member of the local Rotary
Club.
Dale, by contrast, was the first decision to address the "sincerity" of an
organization's purported expression.235 And not coincidentally, the decision
marked the first time an organization alleged expressive views not clearly within
the scope of the reasonable member.236 Yet whether the reasonable member of the
BSA would understand the organization to engage in anti-gay expression is not of
primary concern. The fundamental inquisition instead considers future cases and
whether the reasonable member approach will better remedy the problem of
which Dale warns-namely, bridging the discrepancy between an organization's
suggested expressive values and those of its members. To that end, it seems
undeniable that courts would better protect the First Amendment liberties of
organizational members by inquiring whether a reasonable member understands
the organization to engage in its purported expression than by granting unbridled
discretion to the ostensible views of organizational litigants.
Ken Cowing, who "had always been proud to wear his scoutmaster uniform," thought about
"putting it away" after the Dale decision and, along with Cub Scout Pack 5, mailed a petition to
BSA headquarters. John Sullivan, N.. Law; Rallying the Troops, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29,2000, at
14NJ8. Even BSA parent Lynda Montague stated that the "ruling persuaded her to prevent her
8-year-old son from joining the scouts when he gets older." Andrew Jacobs, The Reaction:
Victory Has Consequences ofIts Own, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2000, at A28.
25Dale, 530 U.S. at 651-52.236 See Backer, supra note 162, at 122 (stating that Dale is a "landmark[] of First
Amendment decline").
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VI. CONCLUSION
This note commenced with a discussion of Myra Bradwell, whose
application to practice law was rejected on the basis of her gender, and Mildred
and Richard Loving, whose interracial marriage served as the basis for criminal
conviction. 7 These cases reveal the manner in which the judiciary may justify
discriminatory practices on moral grounds.238 Yet, as this note has aimed to
demonstrate, such decisions have been problematic both in their long-term
stability and their present-day legitimacy in authorizing discrimination.239
The Dale Court rekindled these same concerns in its deference to the BSA's
claim that the terms "morally straight" and "clean" constitute anti-gay
expression.240 Although the Court attempted to distance itself from such an
inference, its broad deference to the BSA's interpretation effectively resulted in a
judicial disregard for potential discrepancies existing between the values
expressed by organizational litigants and those of its members.
241
Dale thus illustrates the need for an alternative approach to expressive
association that protects the liberties of individual members.2 42 The reasonable
member inquiry provides one such approach.2 43 Although this alternative will not
fully eradicate fraudulent organizational representation, it is a step forward in
bridging the gap between those who assert an organization's expressive values
and those who actually hold them.
27 See supra notes 2-9 and accompanying text.23 Seesupra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
239 See supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text.
240 See supra notes 161-94 and accompanying text.
241 See supra notes 172-78 and accompanying text.242See supra notes 195-225 and accompanying text.243See supra notes 226-36 and accompanying text.
2001] 1513

